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COMPARATIVE STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND
THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE ORDER
BY JOHN K.-H. QUAH AND BRUNO STRULOVICI1
We identify a new way to order functions, called the interval dominance order,t h a t
generalizes both the single crossing property and a standard condition used in statistical
decision theory. This allows us to provide a uniﬁed treatment of the major theorems on
monotone comparative statics with and without uncertainty, the comparison of signal
informativeness, and a non-Bayesian theorem on the completeness of increasing de-
cision rules. We illustrate the concept and results with various applications, including
an application to optimal stopping time problems where the single crossing property is
typically violated.
KEYWORDS: Single crossing property, interval dominance order, supermodularity,
comparative statics, optimal stopping time, capital deepening, complete class theorem,
statistical decision theory, informativeness.
1. INTRODUCTION
A PRINCIPAL CONCERN in the theory of monotone comparative statics is the
behavior of an optimal solution as the objective function changes.2 Consider a
family of real-valued functions {f(· s)}s∈S, deﬁned on the domain X ⊆ R and
parameterized by s in S ⊆ R. Under what conditions can we guarantee that3
argmax
x∈X
f(x s
  ) ≥ argmax
x∈X
f(x s
 ) whenever s
   >s
 ? (1)
In an inﬂuential paper, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) showed that (1)h o l d s
if the family of functions {f(· s)}s∈S obeys the single crossing property (SCP).
Apart from guaranteeing (1), the single crossing property has other features
that make it an easily applicable concept for comparative statics, but it is not
a necessary condition for (1). Indeed, Milgrom and Shannon showed that it is
necessary and sufﬁcient to guarantee that, for all Y ⊆ X,
argmax
x∈Y
f(x s
  ) ≥ argmax
x∈Y
f(x s
 ) whenever s
   >s
   (2)
1We would like to thank Ian Jewitt for many stimulating conversations. Rabah Amir, Alan
Beggs, Eddie Dekel, Juan-Jose Ganuza, Aki Matsui, Paul Milgrom, Leonard Mirman, Andrea
Patacconi, Herakles Polemarchakis, Edward Schlee, and Aleksey Tetenov also provided helpful
feedback. Part of this research was carried out while John Quah was visiting professor at the
National University of Singapore and he would like to thank the Economics Department at NUS
for its hospitality and support. Finally, we are very grateful to the editor and three referees for
their many insightful comments.
2Early contributions to this literature include Topkis (1978), Milgrom and Roberts (1990),
Vives (1990), and Milgrom and Shannon (1994). A textbook treatment can be found in Topkis
(1998). Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2006) discussed applications in political science.
3The sets in (1) are ordered according to the strong set order, which we deﬁne in Section 2.I t
reduces to the standard order on the real numbers when the sets are singletons.
© 2009 The Econometric Society DOI: 10.3982/ECTA75831950 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
This leaves open the possibility that there may be other useful concepts for
comparative statics in situations where the modeler is principally interested in
comparative statics on the domain X (rather than all subsets of X).
The ﬁrst objective of this paper is to introduce a new way to order functions
that is weaker than the single crossing property but is still sufﬁcient to guaran-
tee (1). We call this new order the interval dominance order (IDO). We show
that the family {f(· s)}s∈S obeys the interval dominance order if and only if, for
all intervals Y ⊆ X,
argmax
x∈Y
f(x s
  ) ≥ argmax
x∈Y
f(x s
 ) whenever s
   >s
   (3)
It is clear from this characterization that IDO is weaker than SCP.4
For IDO to be useful in applications, it helps if there is a simple way to check
for the property. A sufﬁcient condition for a family of differentiable functions
{f(· s)}s∈S to obey IDO is that, for any two functions f(· s  ) and f(· s ) with
s   >s  , there is a nondecreasing positive function α (which may depend on s 
and s  ) such that
df
dx
(x s
  ) ≥ α(x)
df
dx
(x s
 ) 
We give applications where the function α arises naturally.
An important feature of the single crossing property is that it is, in some
sense, robust to the introduction of uncertainty. Suppose {f(· s)}s∈S is an SCP
family and interpret s as the state of the world, which is unknown to the agent
when he is choosing x. Assuming that the agent is an expected utility maxi-
mizer, he will choose x to maximize

s∈S f(x s)λ(s)ds,w h e r eλ is his subjec-
tive probability over states. Since the optimal choice of x increases with s if s
is known, one expects the agent’s decision under uncertainty to have the same
pattern, that is, the optimally chosen x should increase when higher states are
more likely. It turns out that SCP does indeed possess this comparative statics
property (see Athey (2002)); formally,
argmax
x∈X

s∈S
f(x s)γ(s)ds ≥ argmax
x∈X

s∈S
f(x s)λ(s)ds (4)
whenever {f(· s)}s∈S obeys SCP and γ dominates λ by the monotone likeli-
hood ratio.5 An important feature of the interval dominance order is that, even
though it is a weaker property than SCP, it is still robust to the introduction of
uncertainty; that is, (4) holds whenever {f(· s)}s∈S obeys IDO.
4Y ⊂ X is an interval of X if any x ∈ X is also in Y whenever there is x  and x   in Y such that
x  ≤ x ≤ x  . For example, if X ={ 1 2 3},t h e n{1 2} (but not {1 3}) is an interval of X.
5Note that γ dominates λ by the monotone likelihood ratio if γ(s)/λ(s) is increasing in s.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1951
The second objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the literature
on monotone comparative statics and the closely related literature in statistical
decision theory on informativeness. In that setting, the agent takes an action x
(in X) before the state is known but after observing a signal z (in Z ⊂ R)w h i c h
conveys information on the true state. The information structure H refers to the
family of distribution functions {H(·|s)}s∈S,w h e r eH(·|s) is the distribution of
z conditional on the state s. Assuming that the agent has a prior given by the
density function λ on S, the value of H for the payoff function f is V(H f) ≡
maxφ∈D[

s∈S

z∈Z f(φ(z) s)dH(z|s)λ(s)ds],w h e r eD is the set of all decision
rules (which are maps from Z to X). So V(H f) is the agent’s ex ante expected
payoff from an optimally chosen decision rule.
Lehmann identiﬁed an intuitive condition under which H can be thought
of as more informative than (another information structure) G.H eg o e so nt o
show that if H is more informative than G, then
V(H f) ≥V(G f) (5)
whenever f obeys the following property: f(· s) is a quasiconcave function
of the action x and (1) holds. (In other words, the peaks of the quasiconcave
functions f(· s)are moving right with increasing s.) This restriction imposed
on f by Lehmann implies that {f(· s)}s∈S obeys the interval dominance or-
der, but signiﬁcantly, it need not obey the single crossing property. We extend
Lehmann’s result by showing that if H is more informative than G, then (5)
holds whenever {f(· s)}s∈S obeys IDO (and thus, in particular, SCP). In this
way, we have found a single condition on the payoff function that is useful for
both comparative statics and comparative informativeness, so results in one
category extend seamlessly into results in the other.6
Our ﬁnal major result uses Lehmann’s informativeness theorem to identify
conditions under which a decision-maker, including one who is not Bayesian,
will pick a decision rule where the action is increasing in the signal. (In statis-
tical terminology, increasing decision rules form an essentially complete class.)
Our result generalizes the complete class theorem of Karlin and Rubin (1956),
who assumed that the payoff functions obey the same restriction as the one
employed by Lehmann; we generalize it to an IDO class of payoff functions.
The paper contains several applications, which serve primarily to illustrate
the use of the IDO property and the results relating to it, but may also be of
interest in themselves. The following are the main applications. (A1) We show
that for any optimal stopping problem, a lower discount rate delays the optimal
stopping time and raises the value of the problem. (A2) The IDO property can
6Economic applications of Lehmann’s concept of informativeness can be found in Persico
(2000), Athey and Levin (2001), Levin (2001), Bergemann and Valimaki (2002), and Jewitt
(2006). The distinction between Lehmann’s restriction on the payoff function and the single
crossing property was ﬁrst highlighted in Jewitt (2006), which also discussed the signiﬁcance of
this distinction in economic applications.1952 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
also be used to examine a basic issue in optimal growth theory: we show that a
lower discount rate leads to capital deepening, that is, the optimal capital stock
is higher at all times. Both (A1) and (A2) are shown under general conditions,
providing signiﬁcant extensions to existing results. (A3) We illustrate the use
of the informativeness results by applying them to a portfolio problem. Con-
sider a group of investors who pool their funds with a single fund manager; the
manager chooses a portfolio consisting of a safe and a risky asset, and each in-
vestor’s return is proportional to their contribution to the fund. We show that
a fund manager who is more informed than another in the sense of Lehmann
can choose a portfolio that gives higher ex ante utility to every investor. (A4) Fi-
nally, we consider a treatment response problem studied in Manski (2005). We
show that our generalization of Karlin and Rubin’s complete class theorem
allows for more realistic payoff functions and fractional treatment rules.7
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the interval
dominance order and its basic properties. Section 3 is devoted to applications.
The IDO property for decision-making under uncertainty is studied in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we introduce Lehmann’s notion of informativeness and
extend his result, while Section 6 proves a complete class theorem; Section 7
concludes.
2. THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE ORDER AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
This section introduces the interval dominance order, provides simple ways
to check that two functions respect this order, and demonstrates its relevance
to monotone comparative statics. We begin with a review of the single crossing
property.
2.1. The Single Crossing Property
Let X be a subset of the real line (denoted by R), and let f and g be two
real-valued functions deﬁned on X. We say that g dominates f by the single
crossing property (which we denote by g  SC f) if, for all x   and x  with x   >x  ,
the following statement holds:
f(x
  )−f(x
 ) ≥ (>)0  ⇒ g(x
  )−g(x
 ) ≥ (>)0   (6)
A family of real-valued functions {f(· s)}s∈S,d e ﬁ n e do nX and parameterized
by s in S ⊂ R, is referred to as an SCP family if the functions are ordered by the
single crossing property (SCP), that is, whenever s   >s  ,w eh a v ef(· s  )  SC
f(· s ). Note that for any x   >x  , the function Δ:S → R deﬁned by Δ(s) =
f(x    s)− f(x   s) crosses the horizontal axis at most once, which gives the
motivation for the term “single crossing.”
7The ﬁrst two examples are found in Section 3, the third in Section 5, and the last in Section 6.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1953
The crucial role played by the single crossing property when comparing the
solutions to optimization problems was highlighted by Milgrom and Shannon
(1994).Since the solution to an optimization problemis not necessarily unique,
before we state their result, we must ﬁrst deﬁne an ordering on sets. Let S  and
S   be two subsets of R. We say that S   dominates S  in the strong set order (see
Topkis (1998)), and we write S   ≥ S  if for any for x   in S   and x  in S ,w e
have max{x   x  } in S   and min{x   x  } in S .8 It follows immediately from this
deﬁnition that if S   ={ x  } and S  ={ x }, then x   ≥ x . More generally, suppose
that both sets contain their largest and smallest elements. Then it is clear that
the largest (smallest) element in S   is larger than the largest (smallest) element
in S .9
THEOREM—Milgrom and Shannon (1994): Suppose that f and g are real-
valued functions deﬁned on X ⊂ R. Then argmaxx∈Y g(x)≥ argmaxx∈Y f(x)for
any Y ⊆ X if and only if g  SC f.10
Note that the necessity of the single crossing property is obvious since we
are requiring monotonicity of the optimal solution for all subsets Y of X.
In particular, we can choose Y ={ x  x   }, in which case argmaxx∈Y g(x) ≥
argmaxx∈Y f(x)implies (6). In fact, SCP is not necessary for monotone com-
parative statics if we only require argmaxx∈Y g(x)≥ argmaxx∈Y f(x)for Y = X
or for Y belonging to a particular subcollection of the subsets of X. Consider
Figures 1 and 2: in both cases, we have argmaxx∈X g(x) ≥ argmaxx∈X f(x);
furthermore, argmaxx∈Y g(x) ≥ argmaxx∈Y f(x),w h e r eY is any closed in-
terval contained in X.I nF i g u r e1, SCP is satisﬁed (speciﬁcally, (6)i ss a t i s -
ﬁed) but this is not true in Figure 2.I nF i g u r e2,w eh a v ef(x  ) = f(x   ) but
g(x  )<g( x  ), violating SCP.
This type of violation of SCP can arise naturally in an economic setting, as
the following simple example shows. We shall return to this example at various
points in the paper to illustrate our results.
EXAMPLE 1: Consideraﬁrmproducingsomegoodwhosepriceweassumeis
ﬁxed at 1 (either because of market conditions or for some regulatory reason).
It has to decide on the production capacity (x) of its plant. Assume that a
plant with production capacity x costs Dx,w h e r eD>0. Let s be the state of
the world, which we identify with the demand for the good. The unit cost of
producing the good in state s is c(s). We assume that, for all s, D + c(s)<1.
8Note that this deﬁnition of the strong set order makes sense on any lattice (see Topkis (1998)).
9Throughout this paper, when we say that something is “greater” or “increasing,” we mean to
say that it is greater or increasing in the weak sense. Most of the comparisons in this paper are
weak, so this convention is convenient. When we are making a strict comparison, we shall say so
explicitly, as in “strictly higher,” “strictly increasing,” and so forth.
10Milgrom and Shannon’s result is situated in a lattice space. The theorem stated here is its
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FIGURE 1.—Illustration of the single-crossing property.
The ﬁrm makes its capacity decision before the state of the world is realized
and makes its production decision after the state is revealed.
Suppose it chooses capacity x and the realized state of the world (and thus
realized demand) is s ≥ x. In this case, the ﬁrm should produce up to its
capacity, so that its proﬁt Π(x s) = x − c(s)x − Dx. On the other hand, if
s<x , the ﬁrm will produce (and sell) s units of the good, giving it a proﬁt
of Π(x s) = s − c(s)s − Dx. It is easy to see that Π(· s) is increasing lin-
early for x ≤ s and thereafter declines linearly with a slope of −D.I t sm a x -
imum is achieved at x = s,w i t hΠ(s s) = (1 − c(s) − D)s. Suppose s   >s  
and c(s  )>c( s  ); in other words, the state with higher demand also has higher
unit cost. Then it is possible that Π(s   s  )<Π( s    s ); diagrammatically, this
means that the peak of the Π(· s  ) curve (achieved at x = s  ) lies below the
Π(· s ) curve. If this occurs, we have the situation depicted in Figure 2,w i t h
f(·) = Π(· s ) and g(·) = Π(· s  ).
2.2. The Interval Dominance Order
We wish to ﬁnd a way to order functions that is useful for monotone com-
parative statics and also weaker than the single crossing property. In particu-STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1955
FIGURE 2.—Illustration of the interval dominance order, where the single-crossing property is
violated.
lar, we want the ordering to allow us to say that g dominates f (with respect
to this new order) whenever both functions are concave and argmaxx∈X g(x)≥
argmaxx∈X f(x)(as in Figure 2). To this end, it is useful to look again at Fig-
ure 2 and to notice that violations of (6) can only occur if we compare points
x  and x   on opposite sides of the maximum point of f. This suggests that a
possible way to weaken SCP, while retaining comparative statics, is to require
(6) to hold only for a certain collection of pairs {x  x   }, rather than all possible
pairs.
The set J is an interval of X if, whenever x  and x   are in J, any element x in
X such that x  ≤ x ≤ x   is also in J.11 Let f and g be two real-valued functions
deﬁned on X. We say that g dominates f by the interval dominance order (or,
for short, g I-dominates f, with the notation g  I f)i f
f(x
  )−f(x
 ) ≥ (>)0  ⇒ g(x
  )−g(x
 ) ≥ (>)0 (7)
11Note that X need not be an interval in the conventional sense, that is, X need not be, using
our terminology, an interval of R. Furthermore, the fact that J is an interval of X does not imply
that it is an interval of R. For example, if X ={ 1 2 3},t h e nJ ={ 1 2} is an interval of X,b u to f
course neither X nor J are intervals of R.1956 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
holds for x   and x  such that x   >x   and f(x   ) ≥ f(x)for all x in the interval
[x  x   ]={ x ∈ X :x  ≤ x ≤ x  }. Clearly, the interval dominance order (IDO) is
weaker than ordering by SCP. For example, in Figure 2, g I-dominates f,b u tg
does not dominate f by SCP.
Notice that for the function g to I-dominate f, two conditions—arising from
the weak and strong inequalities in (7)—have to be satisﬁed. The strong in-
equality in (7) implies the following property:
(A) If f is strictly increasing over some interval [x  x   ] in X, then g is also
strictly increasing over that interval.
The weak inequality part of (7) guarantees the following property:
(B) If f(x   ) ≥ f(x)for x in [x  x   ] and f(x   ) = f(x  ), then g(x  ) ≥ g(x ).
Within a class of well behaved functions, properties (A) and (B) can be used
to characterize the interval dominance order. A real-valued function f de-
ﬁned on an interval X of the real line is piecewise monotone if any compact
interval in X may be partitioned into ﬁnitely many intervals within which f is
either strictly increasing, strictly decreasing, or constant. (In other words, on
any compact set, the function f has ﬁnitely many turning points or plateaus.)
A sufﬁcient condition for a function to be piecewise monotone is that it is
real analytic. The next result says that for continuous and piecewise monotone
functions, IDO is characterized by (A) and (B).
PROPOSITION 112: Suppose X is an interval of R, and f :X → R is continuous
and piecewise monotone. Then g  I f if and only if conditions (A) and (B) (as
deﬁned above) are satisﬁed.
PROOF: It is clear that conditions (A) and (B) are necessary for g  I f.
To show that they are sufﬁcient, we need to show that if f(x   ) ≥ f(x) for x
in [x  x   ] and f(x   )>f( x  ), then g(x  )>g ( x  ).S i n c ef is continuous and
piecewise monotone, we may write [x  x   ]=
N
i=0[ai a i+1],w h e r ea0 = x  and
aN+1 = x  , and the intervals [ai a i+1] belong to two types: either f is strictly
increasing in [ai a i+1] or f(x)≤ f(a i) = f(a i+1) for x ∈[ ai a i+1]. Condition
(A) guarantees that g(ai+1)>g ( a i) for intervals of the ﬁrst type, while condi-
tion (B) guarantees that g(ai+1) ≥ g(ai) for intervals of the second type. In-
tervals of the ﬁrst type must exist since f(x   )>f( x  ) and so we conclude that
g(x  )>g( x  ). Q.E.D.
Note that the continuity of f is needed in this result; without it, the partition
described in the proof may not be possible. For example, suppose f :[0 2]→R
satisﬁes the following: f is strictly decreasing in the interval [0 1),w i t hf(0) =
12We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this result and Proposition 4.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1957
0, and in the interval [1 2],w eh a v ef(x)= 1. Let g obey g(x) = 0f o ra l lx in
[0 2].T h e nf(2) ≥ f(x)for all x in [0 2] and f(2)>f( 0),b u tg(2)  >g( 0).S o
g does not I-dominate f, even though conditions (A) and (B) are satisﬁed.
2.3. The Comparative Statics Theorem
In visualizing the relationship between f and g, it may be helpful to note
that we could rewrite the deﬁnition in the following manner: g  I f if
x
   ∈ argmax
x∈[x  x  ]
f(x)

and x
  / ∈ argmax
x∈[x  x  ]
f(x)

 ⇒ x
   ∈ argmax
x∈[x  x  ]
g(x)

and x
  / ∈ argmax
x∈[x  x  ]
g(x)

 
In other words, on any interval [x  x   ],i ff is maximized at x  , then g is also
maximized at x  ,a n di fx   is the unique maximizer of f in the interval, then
g is also uniquely maximized at x  . It is a small step from this observation to
the more general conclusion that argmaxx∈X g(x)≥ argmaxx∈X f(x)whenever
g  I f. This is stated in Theorem 1, which also gives the precise sense in which
IDO is necessary for monotone comparative statics. For that part of the result,
we impose a mild regularity condition on the objective function. A function
f :X → R is said to be regular if argmaxx∈[x  x  ]f(x)is nonempty for any points
x  and x   with x   >x  . Suppose the set X is such that X ∪[ x  x   ] is always
closed, and thus compact, in R (with the respect to the Euclidean topology).
This is true, for example, if X is ﬁnite, if it is closed, or if it is a (not necessarily
closed) interval. Then f is regular if it is upper semicontinuous with respect to
the relative topology on X.
THEOREM1: Supposethat f and g arereal-valuedfunctionsdeﬁnedon X ⊂ R
and g  I f. Then the following property holds:
argmax
x∈J
g(x)≥ argmax
x∈J
f(x) for any interval J of X  ( )
Furthermore, if property ( ) holds and g is regular, then g  I f.
PROOF: Assume that g I-dominates f, and that x   is in argmaxx∈J f(x)and
x  is in argmaxx∈J g(x). We need only consider the case where x   >x  .S i n c ex  
isin argmaxx∈J f(x),wehavef(x   ) ≥ f(x)forall x in [x  x   ]⊆J.Sinceg  I f,
we also have g(x  ) ≥ g(x ); thus x   is in argmaxx∈J g(x). Furthermore, f(x   ) =
f(x  ) so that x  is in argmaxx∈J f(x).I fn o t ,f(x   )>f( x  ), which implies (by
the fact that g  I f) that g(x  )>g ( x  ), contradicting the assumption that g is
maximized at x .
To prove the other direction, we assume that there is an interval [x  x   ]
such that f(x   ) ≥ f(x) for all x in [x  x   ]. This means that x   is in1958 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
argmaxx∈[x  x  ]f(x). There are two possible violations of IDO. One pos-
sibility is that g(x )>g ( x   ); in this case, by the regularity of g, the set
argmaxx∈[x  x  ]g(x) is nonempty but does not contain x  , which violates ( ).
Another possible violation of IDO occurs if g(x  ) = g(x ) but f(x   )>f( x  ).
In this case, the set argmaxx∈[x  x  ]g(x) either contains x , which violates ( )
since argmaxx∈[x  x  ]f(x)does not contain x , or it does not contain x  ,w h i c h
also violates ( ). Q.E.D.
2.4. Sufﬁcient conditions for IDO
While Theorem 1 is a straightforward result that follows easily from our
deﬁnition of the interval dominance order, it nonetheless provides the ba-
sic motivation for the concept. Beyond this, the usefulness of the IDO con-
cept may hinge on whether there are simple ways of checking that one func-
tion I-dominates another. The next result provides a sufﬁcient condition for I-
dominance; since it is a condition on derivatives, we refer to it as condition (D).
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that X is an interval of R, the functions f, g:X →
R are absolutely continuous on compact intervals in X (and thus f and g are
differentiable a.e.), and the following condition holds:
(D) there is an increasing and strictly positive function α:X → R such that
g (x) ≥ α(x)f  (x) for almost all x.
Then g  I f; more speciﬁcally, if f(x   ) ≥ f(x)for all x ∈[ x x  ], then
g(x
  )−g(x
 ) ≥ α(x
 )(f(x
  )−f(x
 ))  (8)
Note that the function α in Proposition 2 can be a constant function; if it is
a constant ¯ α, then we obtain g(x  ) − g(x ) ≥¯ α(f(x  ) − f(x  )), which implies
g  SC f.W h e nα is not constant, the functions f and g in Proposition 2 need
not be related by SCP, as the following example shows.
Let f :[0 M]→R be a differentiable and quasiconcave function, with
f(0) = 0 and a unique maximum at x∗ in (0 M).L e tα:[0 M]→R be given
by α(x) = 1f o rx ≤ x∗ and α(x) = 1 + (x − x∗) for x>x ∗. Consider g:[0 M]
satisfying g(0) = f(0) = 0w i t hg (x) = α(x)f  (x) (as in Proposition 2). Then it
is clear that g(x)= f(x)for x ≤ x∗ and g(x) < f(x) for x>x ∗. In other words,
g coincides with f up to the point x = x∗; thereafter, g falls more steeply than
f. The function g is also quasiconcave with a unique maximum at x∗ and g
I-dominates f (weakly), but g does not dominate f by SCP. To see this, choose
x  and x   on either side of x∗ such that f(x  ) = f(x   ). Then we have a violation
of (6)s i n c eg(x ) = f(x  ) = f(x   )>g( x   ).13
13If we wish the I-dominance to be strict, deﬁne ˜ g (x) = αf  (x) + ε,w h e r eε is a positive
real number. Then ˜ g I-dominates f strictly (in the sense that argmax[0 M] ˜ g(x) > x∗), but for ε
sufﬁciently small, SCP will still be violated.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1959
The proof of Proposition 2 follows easily from the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: Suppose [x  x   ] is a compact interval of R, and that α and h are
real-valued functions deﬁned on [x  x   ], with h integrable and α increasing (and
thus integrable as well). If
 x  
x h(t)dt ≥ 0 for all x in [x  x   ], then
 x  
x 
α(t)h(t)dt ≥ α(x
 )
 x  
x 
h(t)dt  (9)
PROOF: Weconﬁneourselvestothe casewhere α isanincreasinganddiffer-
entiable function. If we can establish (9) for such functions, then we can extend
it to all increasing functions α since any such function can be approximated by
an increasing and differentiable function.
The function H(t)≡ α(t)
 x  
t h(z)dz is absolutely continuous and thus dif-
ferentiable a.e. By the fundamental theorem of calculus, H(x  ) − H(x ) =  x  
x  H (t)dt; furthermore, H(x ) = α(x )
 x  
x  h(t)dt, H(x  ) = 0, and, by the
product rule,
H
 (t) = α
 (t)
 x  
t
h(z)dz −α(t)h(t)  (10)
Therefore,
−α(x
 )
 x  
x 
h(t)dt =− H(x
 )
=
 x  
x 
H
 (t)dt
=
 x  
x 
α
 (x)
 x  
t
h(z)dz

dt −
 x  
x 
α(t)h(t)dt 
where the last equality follows from (10). The term
 x  
x  α (x)(
 x  
t h(z)dz)dt ≥
0 by assumption and so (9) follows. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Consider x   and x  in X such that x   >x   and
assume that f(x)≤ f(x   ) for all x in [x  x   ].S i n c ef is absolutely continuous
on [x  x   ], f(x   ) − f(x)=
 x  
x f  (t)dt (with an analogous expression for g).
We then have
 x  
x 
g
 (t)dt ≥
 x  
x 
α(t)f
 (t)dt ≥ α(x
 )
 x  
x 
f
 (t)dt 
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1. This leads to (8), from
which we obtain g(x  ) ≥ (>) g(x ) if f(x   ) ≥ (>) f(x  ). Q.E.D.1960 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
It may be helpful to have a version of Proposition 2 for applications where
the agent’s choice set is discrete. This is stated in the next result. The proof is
in the Appendix and uses a discrete version of Lemma 1.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that X ={ x1 x 2     x N}, with xi <x i+1 for i =
1 2     N+1. The functions f, g:X → R satisfy g  I f if there is an increasing
and positive function α:X → R such that
g(xi+1)−g(xi) ≥ α(xi)(f(xi+1)−f(x i)) for i = 1 2     N+1  (11)
While(asweshallseeinthenextsection)Proposition2providesausefulway
to check for IDO, condition (D) in that proposition is not necessary for IDO.
Note that IDO (like SCP) are ordinal properties, so if g  I f, then h◦g  I ˜ h◦f
for any strictly increasing functions h and ˜ h. Consider a differentiable function
f deﬁned on the interval [x  x   ] such that f(x)<f(x   ) for all x in [x  x   ]
and f  (x ) =− 1. Now choose a differentiable and strictly increasing function
¯ h such that ¯ h (f(x )) = 1a n d
¯ g(x
  )− ¯ g(x
 )<f( x
  )−f(x
 )  (12)
where ¯ g = ¯ h ◦ f.W h i l e¯ g  I f, we claim that ¯ g and f are not related by
condition (D). Suppose otherwise; then since ¯ g (x ) =− 1, f  (x ) =− 1, and
g (x) ≥ α(x)f  (x),w em u s th a v eα(x ) ≥ 1, but in this case (8) will contradict
(12). This example also shows that (D) is not an ordinal property: while g = f
and f trivially obeys (D) (simply choose α ≡ 1), ¯ g and f do not obey that con-
dition.
The next result gives a way to weaken condition (D) for the case of analytic
functions. Note that the conditions (A) and (B ) in this result are both ordinal
in the following sense: if g and f obey (A), then h◦g and ˜ h◦f obey (A), where
h and ˜ h are differentiable functions with strictly positive derivatives (and the
same is true of (B )).
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that X is an interval of R and the functions f,
g:X → R are analytic. Then sufﬁcient conditions for g  I f are (A) (as deﬁned
in Section 2.2) and (B ):
(B ) If f(x   ) ≥ f(x)for x in [x  x   ] and f(x   ) = f(x  ), then
g (x )
f  (x )
≤
g (x  )
f  (x  )
(13)
whenever f  (x ) and f  (x  ) are nonzero.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the Appendix; it proceeds by showing that
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Proposition 2 in the following sense: suppose that (D) is satisﬁed, so there is a
positive increasing function α such that g (x) ≥ α(x)f  (x); then g and f obey
(A) and (B ). That they obey (A) is clear. To check that (B ) is satisﬁed, suppose
f(x   ) ≥ f(x)for x in [x  x   ] and f(x   ) = f(x  ), in which case f  (x) ≤ 0a n d
f  (x  ) ≥ 0. If f  (x )  = 0, then g (x ) ≥ α(x )f  (x ) implies that g (x )/f  (x ) ≤
α(x ). Similarly, if f  (x  )  = 0, we have g (x  )/f  (x  ) ≥ α(x  ).I n e q u a l i t y( 13)
follows since α(x ) ≤ α(x  ).
The next section is devoted to applying the theoretical results obtained so
far: we illustrate the use (and usefulness) of the IDO property through a num-
ber of simple examples. We shall focus on individual decision problems,though
our methods can also be applied in a game-theoretic context.15
Our theory could be fruitfully developed in different directions, some of
which we mention in the Conclusion. In this paper, we focus instead on the
development of the theory for decision-making under uncertainty. In particu-
lar, we show in Section 4 that the interval dominance order shares an impor-
tant feature with the SCP order: in some precise sense, the order is preserved
when one moves from a nonstochastic to a stochastic environment. Section 4
also provides the foundation for the results on informativeness covered in Sec-
tions 5 and 6. Readers who are keen on exploring those developments can skip
the next section and go straight to Section 4.
3. APPLICATIONS OF THE IDO PROPERTY
EXAMPLE 2: A very natural application of Proposition 2 is to the compara-
tive statics of optimal stopping time problems. We consider a simple determin-
istic problem here; in Quah and Strulovici (2007) we showed that the results
in the next proposition extend naturally to a stochastic optimal stopping time
problem.
Suppose we are interested in maximizing Vδ(x) =
 x
0 e−δtu(t)dt for x ≥ 0,
where δ>0 and the function u:R+ → R is bounded on compact intervals and
is measurable. So x may be interpreted as the stopping time, δ is the discount
rate, u(t) is the cash ﬂow or utility of cash ﬂow at time t (which may be positive
or negative), and Vδ(x) is the discounted sum of the cash ﬂow (or its utility)
when x is the stopping time.
We are interested in how the optimal stopping time changes with the dis-
count rate. It seems natural that the optimal stopping time will rise as the
discount rate δ falls. This intuition is correct but it cannot be proved by the
14Note that because f is analytic, it is piecewise monotone and continuous.
15Monotone comparative statics based on the single crossing property has been used, among
other things, to guarantee that a player’s strategy is increasing in the strategy of his opponent
(see Milgrom and Roberts (1990)) and, in Bayesian games, to guarantee that a player’s strategy
is increasing in the signal he receives (Athey (2001)). An IDO-based theory can serve the same
purpose and, since our results are more general, the restrictions on payoff functions to guarantee
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methods of concave maximization since Vδ need not be a quasiconcave func-
tion. Indeed, it will have a turning point every time u changes sign and its local
maxima occur when u changes sign from positive to negative. Changing the
discount rate does not change the times at which local maxima are achieved,
but it potentially changes the time at which the global maximum is achieved,
that is, it changes the optimal stopping time. The next result gives the solution
to this problem.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that δ1 >δ 2 > 0. Then the following statements
hold:
(i) Vδ2  I Vδ1,
(ii) argmaxx≥0Vδ2(x) ≥ argmaxx≥0Vδ1(x),
(iii) maxx≥0Vδ2(x) ≥ maxx≥0Vδ1(x) 
PROOF: The functions Vδ2 and Vδ1 are absolutely continuous and thus differ-
entiable a.e.; moreover,
V
 
δ2(x) = e
−δ2xu(x) = e
(δ1−δ2)xV
 
δ1(x) 
Note that the function α(x) = exp((δ1 − δ2)x) is increasing, so Vδ2  I Vδ1 (by
Proposition 2) and (ii) follows from Theorem 1. For (iii), let us suppose that
Vδ1(x) is maximized at x = x∗.T h e nf o ra l lx in [0 x ∗], Vδ1(x) ≤ Vδ1(x∗).N o t e
that Vδ1(0) = Vδ2(0) = 0a n dα(0) = 1. Thus, applying the inequality (8)( w i t h
x  = 0a n dx   = x∗), we obtain Vδ2(x∗) ≥ Vδ1(x∗). Since maxx≥0Vδ2(x) ≥ Vδ2(x∗),
we obtain (iii). Q.E.D.
Arrow and Levhari (1969) gave a version of Proposition 5(iii) (but not (ii)).
Theyrequired u tobeacontinuousfunction;withthisassumption,theyshowed
that the value function ¯ V ,d e ﬁ n e db y ¯ V( δ )= maxx≥0Vδ(x), is right differen-
tiable and has a negative derivative. This result is the crucial step (in their
proof) that guarantees the existence of a unique internal rate of return for an
investment project, that is, a unique δ∗ such that ¯ V( δ ∗) = 0. It is possible for
us to extend and apply Proposition 5 to prove something along these lines, but
we shall not do so in this paper.16
We should point out that we cannot strengthen Proposition 5(i) to say that
Vδ2  SC Vδ1. To see this, suppose u(t) = 1 − t, and choose x  and x   (with x 
and x   smaller and bigger than 1, respectively) such that Vδ1(x ) = Vδ1(x  ).I t
follows from this that the function F,d e ﬁ n e db yF(δ)= Vδ(x  ) − Vδ(x ) =  x  
x  e−δt(1−t)dt, satisﬁes
F(δ1) =
 x  
x 
e
−δ1t(1−t)dt = 0  (14)
16We would like to thank Herakles Polemarchakis for pointing out Arrow and Levhari’s result.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1963
Note that F (δ1) =−
 x  
x  e−δ1tt(1−t)dt >0 because of (14). Therefore, if δ2 is
closetoandsmallerthan δ1,wehaveF(δ2)<0;equivalently, Vδ2(x )>V δ2(x  ).
So we obtain a violation of SCP.17
Put another way, if u(t) = 1 − t and the only stopping times available to the
agent were x  and x  , then while the agent will be indifferent between them
at δ = δ1, she will strictly prefer x  at δ = δ2, so a lower discount rate leads to
earlier stopping. On the other hand, if she can stop at any time x ≥ 0 ,t h e ni ti s
clear that, whatever the discount rate, it is optimal to stop just before u turns
negative, that is, at x = 1. This is reﬂected in Proposition 5.
EXAMPLE 3: Many optimization problems involve trading off costs and ben-
eﬁts. In this case, the objective function has the form Π(x) = B(x) − C(x),
where B(x) and C(x) represent the beneﬁt and cost of action x, respec-
tively. The next proposition provides conditions under which ˜ Π I-dominates
Π,w h e r e ˜ Π = ˜ B − ˜ C.
PROPOSITION 6 18: Suppose that the functions Π and ˜ Π are deﬁned on an
interval X of R, and that the beneﬁt and cost functions for both are differentiable,
with C  > 0. Then ˜ Π  I Π if there exists a positive and increasing function α such
that, for all x ∈ X,( i ) ˜ B (x) ≥ α(x)B (x) and (ii) α(x) ≥ ˜ C (x)/C (x).
PROOF: Clearly, ˜ Π (x) = ˜ B (x) − ˜ C (x) ≥ α(x)Π (x) if assumptions (i) and
(ii) hold. The result then follows from Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
If B  > 0, conditions (i) and (ii) in this proposition may be succinctly written
as
˜ B (x)
B (x)
≥ α(x) ≥
˜ C (x)
C (x)
;
in this case, we may choose α to be ˜ B /B  if this is increasing in x (or ˜ C /C 
if this is increasing in x). In other words, ˜ Π  I Π if the increase in marginal
beneﬁts is proportionately larger than the increase in marginal cost and if (say)
the ratio of beneﬁts after and before the change is increasing in x.
AsanapplicationofProposition6,considertheproﬁtmaximizationproblem
of a ﬁrm, where B(x) = xP(x) is the revenue derived from producing x units
of output. Suppose that the inverse demand function changes from P to ˜ P
17We choose u(t) = 1 − t for concreteness. The crucial features of this example remain true
for any decreasing function u that crosses the horizontal axis.
18We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this more general presentation
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and the cost function changes from C to ˜ C.B yT h e o r e m1,a r gm a x x∈X Π(x)≥
argmaxx∈X Π(x) if ˜ Π  I Π. We claim that this condition holds if
α(x) ≡
˜ P(x)
P(x)
≥
˜ C (x)
C (x)
(15)
and α is increasing in x. In other words, the ﬁrm will increase its output if the
ratio of the inverse demand functions is increasing in x and greater than the ra-
tio of the marginalcosts. To establish this claim, observe that ˜ B(x)= α(x)B(x).
Differentiating this expression and using the inequality α (x)B(x) ≥ 0, we ob-
tain ˜ B (x) ≥ α(x)B (x), so the conditions of Proposition 6 are satisﬁed.19
EXAMPLE 4: We wish to show, in the context of a model of optimal growth,
thatloweringthediscountrateofthe representativeagentleadsto capitaldeep-
ening, that is, a higher capital stock at all times. To do this, we consider the
general optimal control problem
maxU(c k)=
 ∞
0
e
−δsu(c(s) k(s) s)ds
subject to (a) ˙ k(t) = H(c(t) k(t) t),w h e r ec is a vector-valued function (of
t) belonging to a certain set and k is scalar-valued, and (b) the initial con-
dition k(0) = k0. In the context of optimal growth, k(t) is the capital stock
at time t, while the control variables c(t) can include a vector of nondurable
consumption and a vector of time use (including labor hours). Our result re-
quires no functional form assumptions on H, but as an example, we could have
H(c(t) k(t) t) = Q(k(t) c2(t) t)−c1(t)−ηk(t),w h e r eη ∈ (0 1) is the rate
of depreciation, c1(t) and c2(t) are the consumption and labor input at time
t, respectively, and Q(· t)is the production function (which is allowed to vary
with time t). We allow the felicity function u to depend directly on consump-
tion, capital, and time.
We say that capital is beneﬁcial if the optimal value of
 t2
t1 e−δsu(c(s) k(s) 
s)ds subject to (a) and the boundary conditions k(t1) = k1 and k(t2) = k2 is
strictly increasing in k1. In other words, raising the capital stock at t1 strictly
increases the utility achieved in the period [t1 t 2]. Clearly, this is a mild condi-
tion which, in essence, is guaranteed if felicity strictly increases with consump-
tion and production strictly increases with capital. This condition is all that is
needed to guarantee that a lower discount rate leads to capital deepening.20
19Note that our argument does not require that P be decreasing in x.
20This problem is typically treated in a discrete time model using the Bellman equation (see
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PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that capital is beneﬁcial, and (¯ c  ¯ k) and (ˆ c  ˆ k) are
solutions to the optimal growth problem at discount rates ¯ δ and ˆ δ, respectively. If
ˆ δ<¯ δ, then ˆ k(t) ≥ ¯ k(t) for all t ≥ 0.
PROOF: Suppose, contrary to the claim in the proposition, that there is a
time t  at which ¯ k(t )>ˆ k(t ).L e tt be the largest t below t  such that ¯ k(t) =
ˆ k(t); the existence of t is guaranteed by the continuity of ¯ k and ˆ k and the
fact that ¯ k(0) = ˆ k(0).L e tT be the earliest time after t  at which ¯ k(T) = ˆ k(T).
Set T =∞if no such time exists. Notice that for t in [t T],w eh a v e¯ k(t) ≥
ˆ k(t), with a strict inequality for t in (t T). For a given t,d e n o t eb y(˜ c  ˜ k) the
path that maximizes
 T
t e−¯ δsu(c(s) k(s) s)ds subject to (a) and the boundary
conditions k(t) = ˆ k(t) and k(T) = ¯ k(T). We claim that
 T
t
e
−¯ δsu(¯ c(s)  ¯ k(s) s)ds ≥
 T
t
e
−¯ δsu(˜ c(s)  ˜ k(s) s)ds (16)
≥
 T
t
e
−¯ δsu(ˆ c(s)  ˆ k(s) s)ds 
The second inequality follows from the optimality of (˜ c  ˜ k); the ﬁrst inequal-
ity is an equality if t = t and (by the fact that capital is beneﬁcial) is a strict
inequality if t is in (t T). In short, because (¯ k  ¯ c) is the optimal policy at dis-
count rate ¯ δ, any policy that has a lower capital stock at time t in [t T] and that
leads to the same capital stock at time T must accumulate less utility between
t and T (at discount rate ¯ δ).
Deﬁne the function F(· T δ)by
F(t T δ)≡
 T
t
e
−δs	
u(ˆ c(s)  ˆ k(s) s)−u(¯ c(s)  ¯ k(s) s)


ds
with δ = ¯ δ  ˆ δ 
In the previous paragraph found t and T such that (i) ˆ k(t) = ¯ k(t), (ii) ei-
ther T =∞or ˆ k(T) = ¯ k(T), and (iii) for all t in the interval [t T],w eh a v e
F(t T ¯ δ) ≤ 0, where the inequality is strict for t in (t T). (Condition (iii) fol-
lows from (16).)
assumptions on the felicity and production functions to ensure that the capital stock in period
t +1 increases with (i) a fall in the discount rate and (ii) an increase in period t’s capital stock. In
turn, these two properties guarantee that lowering the discount rate raises the capital stock over
all periods. In a continuous time model, the capital stock is a continuous function of time. This
property allows us to dispense with the supermodularity-type assumptions made in the discrete
time model.1966 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
Proposition 2 guarantees that the function F(· T ˆ δ) I-dominates F(· T ¯ δ),
since Ft(t T  ˆ δ) = e(¯ δ−ˆ δ)tFt(t T  ¯ δ).W i t hF(T T  ¯ δ) = 0, condition (iii) and
the I-dominance property imply that F(t T ˆ δ) ≤ F(T T  ˆ δ) = 0  Indeed, since
F(t T ¯ δ) < 0f o rt in (t T), we obtain the sharper conclusion that F(t T ˆ δ) <
0 21 which may be rewritten as
 T
t
e
−ˆ δsu(ˆ c(s)  ˆ k(s) s)ds<
 T
t
e
−ˆ δsu(¯ c(s)  ¯ k(s) s)ds 
Thisisacontradiction:theoptimalityof(ˆ c  ˆ k) atthediscountrate ˆ δmeansthat
it cannot accumulate strictly less utility over the interval [t T] than (¯ c  ¯ k) if the
initial and ﬁnal capital stocks are the same (conditions (i) and (ii)). Q.E.D.
4. THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE ORDER WHEN THE STATE IS UNCERTAIN
Let {f(· s)}s∈S be a family of functions parameterized by s in S.E a c hf u n c -
tion f(· s)maps X ⊂ R to R; S is either an interval of R or consists of ﬁnitely
many points in R. We say this is a quasiconcave family of functions with increas-
ing peaks (QCIP family) if two properties hold. First, every function f(· s)is
regular and quasiconcave, where the latter means that f(· s)is maximized in
some interval [x∗(s) x∗(s)] of X,w i t hf(· s)strictly increasing in the interval
{x ∈ X :x ≤ x∗(s)} and strictly decreasing in the interval {x ∈ X :x ≥ x∗(s)}.
Second, argmaxx∈X f(x s  ) ≥ argmaxx∈X f(x s ) whenever s   >s  .
Interpreting s to be the state of the world, consider the problem of an agent
who has to choose x under uncertainty, that is, before s is realized. We assume
the agent maximizes the expected value of his objective. Formally, when S is
an interval, the agent maximizes
F(x λ)=

s∈S
f(x s)λ(s)ds 
where λ:S → R is the density function deﬁned over the states of the world.
It is natural to think that if the agent considers the higher states to be more
likely, then his optimal value of x will increase. Is this true? Note that a QCIP
family of functions is an instance of an IDO family, that is, a family of regular
functions f(· s):X → R,w i t hX ⊆ R, such that f(· s  ) I-dominates f(· s )
whenever s   >s  ; therefore, we may also pose the same question in that more
general context.
One way to formalize the notion that higher states are more likely is via
the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property. Let λ and γ be two density
21We can see this by retracing the proof of Lemma 1. In Lemma 1, the inequality (3)i ss t r i c ti f
(a)
 x  
x h(t)dt > 0f o rx in a set with positive measure in (x  x   ) and (b) α is a strictly increasing
function. Note that in this application, α(t) = e(¯ δ−ˆ δ)t, which is strictly increasing in t.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1967
functions deﬁned on the interval S of R (or, in the case where S is ﬁnite, two
probability mass functions deﬁned on S) and assume that λ(s) > 0f o rs in S.
We call γ an MLR shift of λ if γ(s)/λ(s) is increasing in s. For distributional
changes of this kind, there are two results that come close, though not quite,
to addressing the problem we posed.
Ormiston and Schlee (1993) identiﬁed some conditions under which an
MLR shift will raise the agent’s optimal choice. Among other conditions, they
assumed that F(·;λ) is a quasiconcave function. This will hold if all functions
in the family {f(· s)}s∈S are concave but will not generally hold if the functions
are just quasiconcave. Athey (2002) gave a related result, which says that an
MLR shift will lead to a higher optimal choice of x provided {f(· s)}s∈S is an
SCP family. As we already pointed out in Example 1, a QCIP family need not
be an SCP family.
The next result gives the solution to the problem we posed.
THEOREM 2: Let {f(· s)}s∈S be an IDO family. Then F(· γ) I F(· λ)if γ is
an MLR shift of λ. Consequently,a r gm a x x∈X F(x γ)≥ argmaxx∈X F(x λ) 
Notice that since {f(· s)}s∈S in Theorem 2 is assumed to be an IDO fam-
ily, we know (from Theorem 1) that argmaxx∈X f(x s  ) ≥ argmaxx∈X f(x s ).
Thus Theorem 2 guarantees that the comparative statics which holds when s is
known also holds when s is unknown, but experiences an MLR shift.22 23
The proof of Theorem 2 requires a lemma (Lemma 2 stated below). Its mo-
tivation arises from the observation that if g  SC f, then for any x   >x   such
that g(x )−g(x  ) ≥ (>) 0, we must also have f(x  )−f(x   ) ≥ (>) 0. Lemma 2
is the (less trivial) analog of this observation in the case when g  I f.
LEMMA 2: Let X be a subset of R, and let f and g be two regular functions
deﬁned on X. Then g  I f if and only if the following property holds:
(M) If g(x ) ≥ g(x) for x in [x  x   ], then
g(x
 )−g(x
  ) ≥ (>)0  ⇒ f(x
 )−f(x
  ) ≥ (>)0  
PROOF: Suppose x  <x    and g(x ) ≥ g(x) for x in [x  x   ].T h e r ea r et w o
possible ways for property (M) to be violated. One possibility is that f(x   )>
f(x  ). By regularity, we know that argmaxx∈[x  x  ]f(x)is nonempty; choosing x∗
inthis set,wehave f(x ∗) ≥ f(x)forall x in [x  x ∗],withf(x ∗) ≥ f(x   )>f( x  ).
Since g  I f,w em u s th a v eg(x∗)>g( x  ), which is a contradiction.
22We echo an observation that was made by Athey (2002) in a similar context.
23Apart from being interesting in itself, the monotonicity property guaranteed by Theorem 2
can play a crucial role in establishing the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in certain
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Theotherpossibleviolationof(M)occursif g(x )>g( x   ) but f(x  ) = f(x   ).
By regularity, we know that argmaxx∈[x  x  ]f(x)is nonempty, and if f is maxi-
mized at x∗ with f(x ∗)>f( x  ), then we are back to the case considered above.
So assume that x  and x   are both in argmaxx∈[x  x  ]f(x).S i n c ef  I g,w em u s t
have g(x  ) ≥ g(x ), contradicting our initial assumption.
So we have shown that (M) holds if g  I f. The proof that (M) implies g  I f
is similar. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: We shall only consider the case where S is an inter-
v a l .T h ec a s ew h e r eS is a ﬁnite set is left to the Appendix. The proof can be
broken down into two distinct steps.
Step 1. Denoting supS by s∗, we prove the following property: if F(x   λ)≥
F(x λ)for x ∈[ x  x   ], then
 s∗
˜ s
(f(x
   s)−f(x
  s))λ(s)ds ≥ 0f o r a n y ˜ s ∈ S. (17)
Assume instead that there is ¯ s such that
 s∗
¯ s
(f(x
   s)−f(x
  s))λ(s)ds < 0  (18)
By the regularity of f(·  ¯ s), there is ¯ x that maximizes f(·  ¯ s)in [x  x   ].W ec l a i m
that F(x   λ)<F(¯ x λ), which is a contradiction. To establish this inequality,
we break up F(x   λ)−F(¯ x λ) into the integral above ¯ s and that below ¯ s,a n d
examine each in turn.
Since f(¯ x  ¯ s) ≥ f(x ¯ s) for all x in [¯ x x  ] and {f(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family,
we also have f(¯ x s) ≥ f(x    s)for all s ≤ ¯ s (using Lemma 2). Thus
 ¯ s
s∗
(f(¯ x s)−f(x
   s))λ(s)ds ≥ 0  (19)
where s∗ = infS. Notice also that f(¯ x ¯ s) ≥ f(x ¯ s) for all x in [x   ¯ x],w h i c h
implies that f(¯ x s) ≥ f(x   s)for all s ≥ ¯ s. Aggregating across s,w eo b t a i n
 s∗
¯ s
(f(¯ x s)−f(x
  s))λ(s)ds ≥ 0  (20)
It follows from (18)a n d( 20) that
 s∗
¯ s
(f(¯ x s)−f(x
   s))λ(s)ds
=
 s∗
¯ s
(f(¯ x s)−f(x
  s))λ(s)ds +
 s∗
¯ s
(f(x
  s)−f(x
   s))λ(s)ds
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Combining this with (19), we obtain
 s∗
s∗ (f(¯ x s)−f(x    s))λ(s)ds > 0; in other
words, F(¯ x λ) > F(x   λ). This completes our proof of (17).
Step 2. The function H(· λ):[s∗ s∗]→R deﬁned by
H(˜ s λ)=
 ˜ s
s∗
(f(x
   s)−f(x
  s))λ(s)ds
satisﬁes H(s∗ λ)≥ H(˜ s λ) for all ˜ s in [s∗ s∗]; this follows from (17). Deﬁning
H(· γ)in an analogous fashion, we also have H (˜ s γ) =[ γ(s)/λ(s)]H (˜ s λ)
for ˜ s in S.S i n c eγ is an upward MLR shift of λ, the ratio γ(s)/λ(s) is in-
creasing in s.B yP r o p o s i t i o n2, H(· γ) I H(· λ). In particular, we have
H(s∗ γ)≥ (>) H(s∗ γ)= 0i fH(s∗ λ)≥ (>) H(s∗ λ)= 0. Rewriting this, we
have F(x   γ)≥(>) F(x  γ)if F(x   λ)≥ (>) F(x  λ). Q.E.D.
It is natural to ask whether the MLR condition in Theorem 2 can be weak-
ened, that is, can we obtain F(· γ) I F(· λ) for every IDO family without
requiring an MLR shift from λ to γ? The following proposition shows, in the
context where S is ﬁnite, that the answer is “No.” Indeed, it makes a stronger
claim: MLR shifts arenecessary as long as one requires monotone comparative
statics for every SCP family.
PROPOSITION 8: Let γ and λ be two probability mass functions deﬁned on
S ={ 1 2     N} and suppose that γ is not an MLR shift of λ. Then there is an
SCP family {f(· i)}i∈S with argmaxx∈X F(x γ)<argmaxx∈X F(x λ).
The proof of Proposition 8 is in the Appendix. We end this section with two
simple applications of Theorem 2.
EXAMPLE 1—Continued: Recall that in state s, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is Π(x s).
It achieves its maximum at x∗(s) = s with Π(s s) = (1 − c(s) − D)s,w h i c h
is strictly positive by assumption. The ﬁrm has to choose its capacity be-
fore the state of the world is realized; we assume that s is drawn from
S, an interval in R, and has a distribution given by the density function
λ:S → R. We can think of the ﬁrm as maximizing its expected proﬁt, which is 
S Π(x s)λ(s)ds, or, more generally, its expected utility from proﬁt, which is
U(x λ)=

S u(Π(x s) s)λ(s)ds, where, for each s, the function u(· s):R →
R is strictly increasing. The family {u(Π(· s) s)}s∈S is a QCIP, hence IDO, fam-
ily. By Theorem 2, we know that an upward MLR shift of the density function
will lead the ﬁrm to choose a greater capacity.
EXAMPLE 5: Consider a ﬁrm that has to decide on when to launch a new
product. The more time the ﬁrm gives itself, the more it can improve the
quality of the product and its manufacturing process, but it also knows that
there is a rival about to launch a similar product. If it is not anticipated by1970 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
its rival, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt is a continuous and strictly increasing function of
time φ:R+ → R+. If the rival launches its product at time s, then the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt has a step fall at s and thereafter declines strictly with time. Formally,
the ﬁrm’s proﬁt function in state s,d e n o t e db yπ(· s), satisﬁes π(t s)= φ(t)
for t ≤ s and π(t s)= w(t s) for t>s ,w h e r ew is strictly decreasing in t and
limt→s+ w(t s) < φ(s). The ﬁrm decides on the launch date t by maximizing
Π(t λ)=

s∈S π(t s)λ(s)ds,w h e r eλ:R+ → R is the density function over s.
It is clear that each π(· s)is a quasiconcave function and {π(· s)}s∈S is a QCIP
(henceIDO)family,though Π(· λ)neednotbeaquasiconcavefunction(of t).
By Theorem 2, if the ﬁrm thinks that it is less likely that the rival will launch
early, in the sense that there is an MLR shift in the density function, then it
will decide on a later launch date.
5. COMPARING INFORMATION STRUCTURES24
Consider an agent who, as in the previous section, has to make a decision
before the state of the world (s) is realized, where the set of possible states S is
a subset of R. Suppose that, before he makes his decision, the agent observes
as i g n a lz. This signal is potentially informative of the true state of the world;
we refer to the collection {H(·|s)}s∈S,w h e r eH(·|s) is the distribution of the
signal z conditional on s, as the information structure of the decision-maker’s
problem.(Whenever convenient, we shall simplycall this information structure
H.) We assume that, for every s, H(·|s) admits a density function and has the
compact interval Z ⊂ R as its support. We say that H is MLR-ordered if the
density function of H(·|s  ) is an MLR shift of the density function of H(·|s )
whenever s   >s  .
We assume that the agent has a prior distribution Λ on S. We allow ei-
ther of the following: (i) S is a compact interval and Λ admits a density func-
tion with S as its support or (ii) S is ﬁnite and Λ has S as its support. The
agent’s decision rule (under H) is a measurable map from Z to the set of ac-
tions X (contained in R). Denoting the utility of action x in state s by u(x s),
the decision rule φ:Z → X gives the ex ante expected utility U(φ H Λ)= 
S

Z u(φ(z) s)dH(z|s)dΛ(s) 
We denote the agent’s posterior distribution (on S)u p o no b s e r v i n gz by
Λz
H. The ex ante utility of an agent with the decision rule φ:Z → X may be
equivalently written as
U(φ H Λ)=

z∈Z

s∈S
u(φ(z) s)dΛ
z
H

dMH Λ 
where MH Λ is the marginal distribution of z. A decision rule ˆ φ:Z → X that
maximizes the agent’s (posterior) expected utility at each realized signal is
24We are very grateful to Ian Jewitt for introducing us to the literature in this section, and the
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called an H-optimal decision rule. We assume that X is compact and that
{u(· s)}s∈S is an equicontinuous family. This guarantees that the map from x to 
S u(x s)dΛz
H(s) is continuous, so the problem maxx∈X

S u(x s)dΛz
H(s) has a
solution at every value of z; in other words, ˆ φ exists. The agent’s ex ante utility
using such a rule is denoted by V(H Λ u).
Consider now an alternative information structure given by G ={ G(·|s)}s∈S;
we assume that G(·|s) admits a density function and has the compact interval
Z as its support. What conditions will guarantee that the information structure
H is more favorable than G in the sense of offering the agent a higher ex ante
utility; in other words, how can we guarantee that V(H Λ u) ≥V(G Λ u)?
It is well known that this holds if H is more informative than G according to
the criterion developed by Blackwell (1953); furthermore, this criterion is also
necessary if one does not impose signiﬁcant restrictions on u (see Blackwell
(1953) or, for a recent textbook treatment, Gollier (2001)). We wish instead to
consider the case where a signiﬁcant restriction is imposed on u; speciﬁcally,
we assume that {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family. We show that, in this context, a
different notion of informativeness due to Lehmann (1988) is the appropriate
concept.25
Our assumptions on H guarantee that, for any s, H(·|s) admits a density
function with support Z; therefore, for any (z s) in Z×S, there exists a unique
element in Z, which we denote by T(z s), such that H(T(z s)|s) = G(z|s).
We say that H is more accurate than G if T is an increasing function of s.26
To gain some intuition on why this is a natural deﬁnition, note that since the
signals under H and G do not interact, there is no loss of generality if we
imagine that the signals are monotonically related to one another. With that
convenient point of view, Lehmann’s condition says that for a given signal from
G, the higher is the state s, the higher is the signal under H.T h u sH gives
more information. It is of course crucial that we are in an ordered context
where “higher” and “lower” make sense. Our goal in this section is to prove
the following result.
THEOREM 3: Suppose {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family, G is MLR-ordered, and Λ
is the agent’s prior distribution on S. If H is more accurate than G, then
V(H Λ u)≥V(G Λ u)  (21)
25Jewitt (2006) gave the precise sense in which Lehmann’s concept is weaker than Blackwell’s
(see also Lehmann (1988)a n dP e r s i c o( 2000)) and also discussed its relationship with the concept
of concordance. Some papers with economic applications of Lehmann’s concept of informative-
ness are Persico (2000), Athey and Levin (2001), Levin (2001), Bergemann and Valimaki (2002),
and Jewitt (2006). Athey and Levin (2001) explored other related concepts of informativeness
and their relationship with the payoff functions. The manner in which these papers are related
to Lehmann’s (1988) result and to each other is not straightforward; Jewitt (2006)p r o v i d e da n
overview.
26The concept is Lehmann’s; the term accuracy follows Persico (2000).1972 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
This theorem generalizes a number of earlier results. Lehmann (1988)e s -
tablished a special case of Theorem 3 in which {u(· s)}s∈S is a QCIP family.
Persico (1996) gave a version of Theorem 3 in which {u(· s)}s∈S is an SCP fam-
ily, but he required the optimal decision rule to vary smoothly with the signal,
a property that is not generally true without the sufﬁciency of the ﬁrst-order
conditions for optimality. Jewitt (2006)p r o v e dT h e o r e m3 for the general SCP
case.27
To prove Theorem 3,w eﬁ r s tn o t et h a tif G is MLR-ordered, then the family of
posterior distributions {Λ
z
G}z∈Z is also MLR-ordered, that is, if z   >z  , then Λ
z  
G
is an MLR shift of Λ
z 
G. This result follows from Bayes’ rule, which tells us that
λG(s|z  )
λG(s|z )
=
m(z )
m(z  )
g(z  |s)
g(z |s)
  (22)
where λG(·|z) is the density function of Λ
z
G (or, in the case where S is ﬁnite,
the probability mass function), g(·|s) is the density function of G(·|s),a n dm
is the density function of the marginal distribution over z.W h e nG is MLR-
ordered and z   >z  , the right hand side of this equation is increasing in s,s o
the left hand side is also increasing in s and thus {Λ
z
G}z∈Z is MLR-ordered.28
Since {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family, Theorem 2 guarantees that there exists a
G-optimal decision rule that is increasing in z. Therefore, Theorem 3 is valid
if we can show that for any increasing decision rule ψ:Z → X under G, there
is a rule φ:Z → X under H that gives a higher ex ante utility; that is,

S

Z
u(φ(z) s)dH(z|s)dΛ(s) ≥

S

Z
u(ψ(z) s)dG(z|s)dΛ(s) 
This inequality in turn follows from aggregating (across s) the inequality (23)
below.
PROPOSITION 9: Suppose {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family and H is more accu-
rate than G. Then for any increasing decision rule ψ:Z → X under G, there is an
increasing decision rule φ:Z → X under H such that, at each state s, the distri-
bution of utility induced by φ and H(·|s) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the
distribution of utility induced by ψ and G(·|s). Consequently, at each state s,

Z
u(φ(z) s)dH(z|s)≥

Z
u(ψ(z) s)dG(z|s)  (23)
27However, there is a sense in which it is incorrect to say that Theorem 3 generalizes
Lehmann’s result. The criterion employed by us here (and indeed by Persico (1996)a n dJ e w i t t
(2006) as well)—comparing information structures with the ex ante utility—is less stringent than
the criterion Lehmann used. In the next section we shall compare information structures using
precisely the same criterion as Lehmann and prove a result (Corollary 1) that is stronger than
Theorem 3.
28A discussion of results closely related to this can be found in Milgrom (1981).STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1973
(At a given state s, a decision rule ρ and a distribution on z induce a dis-
tribution of utility in the following sense: for any measurable set U of R, the
probability of {u ∈ U} equals the probability of {z ∈ Z:u(ρ(z) s) ∈ U}.S oi t
is meaningful to refer, as this proposition does, to the distribution of utility at
each s.)
Our proof of Proposition 9 requires the following lemma.
LEMMA 3: Suppose {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family and H is more accurate than
G. Then for any increasing decision rule ψ:Z → X under G, there is an increas-
ing decision rule φ:Z → X under H such that, for all (z s),
u

φ(T(z s)) s

≥ u(ψ(z) s)  (24)
PROOF: We shall only demonstrate here how we construct φ from ψ in the
case where ψ takes only ﬁnitely many values. This is true, in particular, when
the set of actions X is ﬁnite. The extension to the case where the range of ψ
is inﬁnite is shown in the Appendix; the proof that φ is increasing is also post-
poned to the Appendix. The proof below assumes that S is a compact interval,
but it can be modiﬁed in an obvious way to deal with the case where S is ﬁnite.
The proof is divided into two steps. In Step 1, the problem of ﬁnding φ will
be reformulated in a way that makes it easier to solve. In Step 2, we provide an
explicit construction of φ.
Step 1. For every ¯ t in Z and s in S, there is a unique ¯ z in Z such that
¯ t = T(¯ z s). This follows from the fact that G(·|s) is a strictly increasing con-
tinuous function (since it admits a density function with support Z). We write
¯ z = τ(¯ t s);notethatbecause T isincreasinginbothitsarguments,the function
τ:Z × S → Z is decreasing in s. Given this, the problem of ﬁnding φ obeying
(24) is equivalent to the problem of ﬁnding φ such that, for all (t s),
u(φ(t) s) ≥ u

ψ(τ(t s)) s

  (25)
Step 2. We now show how, for a given value of t, we may construct φ(t) to
obey (25). Note that because τ is decreasing and ψ is increasing, the function
ψ(τ(t ·)) is decreasing in s. This, together with our assumption that ψ takes ﬁ-
nitely many values, allow us to partition S =[ s∗ s∗∗] into the sets S1, S2     S M,
where M is odd, with the following properties: (i) if m>n , then any element
in Sm is greater than any element in Sn; (ii) whenever m is odd, Sm is a single-
ton, with S1 ={ s∗} and SM ={ s∗∗}; (iii) when m is even, Sm is an open interval;
(iv) for any s  and s   in Sm,w eh a v eψ(τ(t s )) = ψ(τ(t s  ));( v )f o rs   in Sm
and s  in Sn such that m>n, ψ(τ(t s )) ≥ ψ(τ(t s  )).
In other words, we have partitioned S into ﬁnitely many sets, so that within
each set, ψ(τ(t ·)) takes the same value. Denoting ψ(τ(t s)) for s in Sm by
ψm, (v) says that ψ1 ≥ ψ2 ≥ ψ3 ≥···≥ψM. Establishing (25) involves ﬁnding
x∗ such that
u(x
∗ s m) ≥ u(ψm s m) for any sm ∈ Sm (m = 1 2     M) (26)1974 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
and then setting x∗ = φ(t). Indeed such an x∗ can always be constructed given
any decreasing sequence of actions {ψm}1≤m≤M. (Loosely speaking, the reason
for this is that optimality requires actions to increase with the state, while this
sequence is moving in the wrong direction.)
In the interval [ψ2 ψ 1], we pick the largest action ˆ φ2 that maximizes u(· s∗)
in that interval. This exists because u(· s∗) is continuous and X ∩[ ψ2 ψ 1] is
compact. By the IDO property,
u( ˆ φ2 s m) ≥ u(ψm s m) for any sm ∈ Sm (m = 1 2)  (27)
Recall that S3 is a singleton; we call that element s3. The action ˆ φ4 is chosen
to be the largest action in [ψ4  ˆ φ2] that maximizes u(· s 3).S i n c eψ3 is in that
interval, we have u( ˆ φ4 s 3) ≥ u(ψ3 s 3).S i n c eu( ˆ φ4 s 3) ≥ u(ψ4 s 3), the IDO
property guarantees that u( ˆ φ4 s 4) ≥ u(ψ4 s 4) for any s4 in S4. Using the IDO
property again (speciﬁcally, Lemma 2), we have u( ˆ φ4 s m) ≥ u( ˆ φ2 s m) for sm
in Sm (m = 1 2) since u( ˆ φ4 s 3) ≥ u( ˆ φ2 s 3). Combining this with (27), we have
found ˆ φ4 in [ψ4  ˆ φ2] such that
u( ˆ φ4 s m) ≥ u(ψm s m) for any sm ∈ Sm (m = 1 2 3 4)  (28)
We can repeat the procedure ﬁnitely many times, at each stage choosing
ˆ φm+1 (for m odd) as the largest element maximizing u(· s m) in the inter-
val [ψm+1  ˆ φm−1] and, ﬁnally, choosing ˆ φM+1 as the largest element maximiz-
ing u(· s∗∗) in the interval [ψM  ˆ φM−1]. It is clear that φ(t) = ˆ φM will sat-
isfy (26). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:L e t˜ z denote the random signal received under
information structure G and let ˜ uG denote the (random) utility achieved when
the decision rule ψ is used. Correspondingly, we denote the random signal
received under H by ˜ t,w i t h˜ uH denoting the utility achieved by the rule φ,
as constructed in Lemma 3. Observe that for any ﬁxed utility level u  and at a
given state s ,
Pr[˜ u
H ≤ u
 |s = s
 ]=Pr
	
u(φ(˜ t) s
 ) ≤ u
 |s = s
 

= Pr
	
u

φ(T(˜ z s
 )) s
 
≤ u
 |s = s
 

≤ Pr
	
u(ψ(˜ z) s
 ) ≤ u
 |s = s
 

= Pr[˜ u
G ≤ u
 |s = s
 ] 
where the second equality comes from the fact that, conditional on s = s , the
distribution of ˜ t coincides with that of T(˜ z s ), and the inequality comes from
the fact that u(φ(T(z s )) s ) ≥ u(ψ(z) s ) for all z (by Lemma 3).STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1975
Finally, the fact that, given the state, the conditional distribution of ˜ uH ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates ˜ uG means that the conditional mean of ˜ uH must
also be higher than that of ˜ uG. Q.E.D.
EXAMPLE 1—Continued: As a simple application of Theorem 3,w er e t u r n
again to this example (previously discussed in Sections 2 and 4), where a ﬁrm
hastodecideonitsproductioncapacitybeforethestateoftheworldisrealized.
Recall that the proﬁt functions {Π(· s)}s∈S form an IDO (though not necessar-
ily SCP) family. Suppose that before it makes its decision, the ﬁrm receives a
signal z from the information structure G. Provided G is MLR-ordered, we
know that the posterior distributions (on S) will also be MLR-ordered (in z).
It follows from Theorem 2 that a higher signal will cause the ﬁrm to decide on
a higher capacity. Assuming the ﬁrm is risk neutral, its ex ante expected proﬁt
is V(G Λ Π),w h e r eΛ is the ﬁrm’s prior on S.T h e o r e m3 tells us that a more
accurate information structure H will lead to a higher ex ante expected proﬁt;
the difference V(H Λ Π)−V(G Λ Π) represents what the ﬁrm is willing to
spend for the more accurate information structure.
It is worth pointing out that our use of Proposition 9 to prove Theorem 3
(via (23)) does not fully exploit the property of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
that Proposition 9 obtains. In our next application, this stronger conclusion is
crucial.
EXAMPLE 6: There are N investors, with investor i having wealth wi > 0a n d
the strictly increasing Bernoulli utility function vi. These investors place their
wealth with a manager who decides on an investment policy; speciﬁcally, the
manager allocates the total pool of funds W =
N
i=1wi between a risky asset
with return s in state s and a safe asset with return r>0. Denoting the fraction
invested in the risky asset by x, investor i’s utility (as a function of x and s)i s
given by ui(x s) = vi((xs +(1−x)r)wi). It is easy to see that {ui(· s)}s∈S is an
IDO family. Indeed, it is also an SCP and a QCIP family: for s>r, ui(· s)is
strictly increasing in x;f o rs = r, ui(· r)is the constant vi(rwi);a n df o rs<r,
ui(· s)is strictly decreasing in x.
Before she makes her portfolio decision, the manager receives a signal z
from some information structure G. She employs the decision rule ψ,w h e r e
ψ(z) (in [0 1]) is the fraction of W invested in the risky asset. We assume that
ψ isincreasinginthesignal;inthenextsectionweshallgivetheprecisesensein
which this restriction involves no loss of generality. Suppose that the manager
nowhasaccesstoasuperiorinformationstructure H.ByP roposition9,there is
an increasing decision rule φ under H such that, at any state s, the distribution
of investor k’s utility under H and φ ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the
distribution of k’s utility under G and ψ. In particular, (23)h o l d sf o ru = uk.
Aggregating across states, we obtain Uk(φ H Λ k) ≥ Uk(ψ G Λ k),w h e r eΛk
is investor k’s (subjective) prior; in other words, k’s ex ante utility is higher
with the new information structure and the new decision rule.1976 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
But even more can be said, because, for any other investor i, ui(· s) is a
strictly increasing transformation of uk(· s), that is, there is a strictly increas-
ing function f such that ui = f ◦ uk. It follows from Proposition 9 that (23)i s
true, not just for u = uk,b u tf o ru = ui. Aggregating across states, we obtain
Ui(φ H Λ i) ≥Ui(ψ G Λ i),w h e r eΛi is investor i’s prior.
To summarize, we have shown the following: although different investors
may have different attitudes toward risk aversion and different priors, the
greater accuracy of H compared to G allows the manager to implement a new
decision rule that gives greater ex ante utility to every investor.
Finally, we turn to the following question: How important is the accuracy
criterion to the results of this section? For example, Theorem 3 tells us that
when H is more accurate than G, it gives the agent a higher ex ante utility for
any prior that he may have on S. This raises the possibility that the accuracy
criterion may be weakened if we only wish H to give a higher ex ante utility
than G for a particular prior. However, this is not the case, as the next result
shows.
PROPOSITION 10: Let S be ﬁnite, and let H and G be two information struc-
tures on S. If (21) holds at a given prior Λ∗ which has S as its support and for any
SCP family {u(· s)}s∈S, then (21) holds at any prior Λ which has S as its support
and for any SCP family.
PROOF: For the distribution Λ∗ (Λ) we denote the probability of state s by
λ∗(s) (λ(s)). Given the SCP family {u(· s)}s∈S, deﬁne the family {˜ u(· s)}s∈S by
˜ u(x s) =[ λ(s)/λ∗(s)]u(x s)  The ex ante utility of the decision rule φ under
H when the agent’s utility is ˜ u may be written as
˜ U(φ H Λ
∗) =

s∈S
λ
∗(s)

˜ u(φ(z) s)dH(z|s) 
Clearly,
U(φ H Λ)≡

s∈S
λ(s)

u(φ(z) s)dH(z|s)= ˜ U(φ H Λ
∗) 
From this, we conclude that
V(H Λ u)=V(H Λ
∗  ˜ u)  (29)
Crucially,thefactthat {u(· s)}s∈S isanSCPfamilyguaranteesthat {˜ u(· s)}s∈S is
also an SCP family. By assumption, V(H Λ∗  ˜ u) ≥ V(G Λ∗  ˜ u). Applying (29)
to both sides of this inequality, we obtain V(H Λ u)≥ V(G Λ u). Q.E.D.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1977
Loosely speaking, this result says that if we wish to have ex ante utility
comparability for any SCP family (or, even more strongly, any IDO family),
then ﬁxing the prior does not lead to a weaker criterion of informativeness.
A weaker criterion can only be obtained if we ﬁx the prior and require ex ante
utility comparability for a smaller class of utility families.29
To construct a converse to Theorem 3, we assume that there are two states
and two actions, and that the actions are nonordered with respect to u in the
sense that x1 is the better action in state s1 and that x2 is the better action in
s2 (i.e., u(x1 s 1)>u ( x 2 s 1) and u(x1 s 2)<u ( x 2 s 2)). This condition guaran-
tees that information on the state is potentially useful; if it does not hold, the
decision problem is clearly trivial since either x1 or x2 will be unambiguously
superior to the other action. Note also that the family {u(· s 1) u(· s 2)} is an
IDO family. We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 11: Suppose that S ={ s1 s 2}, X ={ x1 x 2}, and that the actions
are nonordered with respect to u. If H is MLR-ordered and not more accurate
than G, then there are a prior ¯ Λ on S such that V(H  ¯ Λ u) <V(G  ¯ Λ u).
PROOF:S i n c e H is not more accurate than G, there are ¯ z and ¯ t such that
G(¯ z|s1) = H(¯ t|s1) and G(¯ z|s2)<H(¯ t|s2)  (30)
Given any prior Λ and with the information structure H,w em a yw o r ko u t
the posterior distribution and the posterior expected utility of any action after
receipt of a signal. We claim that there is a prior ¯ Λ such that action x1 max-
imizes the agent’s posterior expected utility after he receives the signal z<¯ t
(under H) and action x2 maximizes the agent’s posterior expected utility after
he receives the signal z ≥ ¯ t. This result follows from the assumption that H is
MLR-ordered a n di sp r o v e di nt h eAppendix.
Therefore, the decision rule φ such that φ(z)= x1 for z<¯ t and φ(z)= x2
for z ≥ ¯ t maximizes the agent’s ex ante utility, that is,
V(H  ¯ Λ u) = U(φ H  ¯ Λ)
= ¯ λ(s1)

u(x1|s1)H(¯ t|s1)+u(x2|s1)[1−H(¯ t|s1)]

+ ¯ λ(s2)

u(x1|s2)H(¯ t|s2)+u(x2|s2)[1−H(¯ t|s2)]

 
Now consider the decision rule ψ under G given by ψ(z) = x1 for z<¯ z and
ψ(z) = x2 for z ≥ ¯ z.W eh a v e
U(ψ G  ¯ Λ) = ¯ λ(s1)

u(x1|s1)G(¯ z|s1)+u(x2|s1)[1−G(¯ z|s1)]

+ ¯ λ(s2)

u(x1|s2)G(¯ z|s2)+u(x2|s2)[1−G(¯ z|s2)]

 
29This possibility was explored by Athey and Levin (2001).1978 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
Comparing the expressions for U(ψ G  ¯ Λ) and U(φ H  ¯ Λ),a n db e a r i n gi n
mind (30) and the fact that x2 is the optimal action in state s2, we see that
U(ψ G  ¯ Λ) > U(φ H  ¯ Λ) = V(H  ¯ Λ u) 
Therefore, V(G  ¯ Λ u) > V(H  ¯ Λ u)  Q.E.D.
6. THE COMPLETENESS OF INCREASING DECISION RULES
The model of information we constructed in the last section is drawn from
statistical decision theory.30 In the context of statistical decisions, the agent is a
statistician conducting an experiment, the signal is the random outcome of the
experiment, and the state of the world should be interpreted as a parameter
of the model being considered by the statistician. In the previous section, we
identiﬁed conditions under which a Bayesian statistician (i.e., a statistician who
has a prior on the states of the world) will pick an increasing decision rule.
Our objective in this section is to strengthen that conclusion: we show that,
under the same conditions, statisticians who use other criteria to choose their
decision rule may also conﬁne their attention to increasing decision rules. This
conclusion follows from a natural application of the informativeness results of
the previous section (in particular, Proposition 9).
Consider an information structure G ={ G(·|s)}s∈S; as in the previous sec-
tion, we assume that the signal z is drawn from a compact interval Z and that
its distribution G(·|s) admits a density function with Z as its support. The set
of possible states, S, may either be a compact interval or a ﬁnite set of points.
Unlike the previous section, we do not assume that the statistician has a prior
on S. The utility associated with each action and state is given by the function
u:X × S → R. We assume that the set of actions X is a compact subset of R
and that u is continuous in x.
Let D be the set of all decision rules (which are measurable maps from Z to
X). The expected utility of the rule ψ in state s (denoted by EG(ψ s))i sd e ﬁ n e d
as
EG(ψ s) =

z∈Z
u(ψ(z) s)dG(z|s) 
Note that our assumptions guarantee that this is well deﬁned.
The decision rule ˜ ψ is said to be at least as good as another decision ψ if it
gives higher expected utility in all states, that is, EG( ˜ ψ s) ≥ EG(ψ s) for all s
in S.As u b s e tD  of decision rules forms an essentially complete class if for any
30For an introduction to statistical decision theory, see Blackwell and Girshik (1954)o rB e r g e r
(1985). Statistical decision theory has been used in econometrics to study portfolio allocation,
treatment choice, and model uncertainty in macroeconomic policy, among other areas. See the
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decision rule ψ, there is a rule ˜ ψ in D  that is at least as good as ψ. Results
that identify some subset of decision rules as an essentially complete class are
called complete class theorems.31
Itisusefultoidentifysuchaclassofdecisionrulesbecause,whilestatisticians
may differ on the criterion they adopt to choose amongst decision rules, it is
typically the case that a rule satisfying their preferred criterion can be found in
an essentially complete class. Consider the Bayesian statistician with prior Λ;
her ex ante utility from the rule ψ (recall that this is denoted by U(ψ G Λ))
can be written as

s∈S EG(ψ s)dΛ(s). It is clear that if U(ψ G Λ)is maximized
at ψ = ˆ ψ, then a rule ˜ ψ in the complete class that is at least as good as ˆ ψ will
also maximize U(ψ G Λ).
A non-Bayesian statistician will choose a rule using a different criterion;
the two most commonly used criteria are the maxmin and minimax regret.
The maxmin criterion evaluates a decision rule according to the lowest util-
ity the rule could bring; formally, a rule ˆ ψ satisﬁes this criterion if it solves
maxψ∈D{mins∈S EG(ψ s)}.T h eregret of a decision rule ψ, which we denote by
r(ψ),i sd e ﬁ n e da sm a x s∈S[maxψ ∈DEG(ψ  s)−EG(ψ s)]. In other words, the re-
gret of a rule ψ is the utility gap between the ideal rule (if s is known) and the
rule ψ. A rule ˆ ψ satisﬁes the minimax regret criterion if it solves minψ∈Dr(ψ).
It is not hard to check that if a decision rule for either the maxmin or minimax
regret criterion exists, then such a rule can be found in an essentially complete
class.32
The following complete class theorem is the main result of this section. It
provides a justiﬁcation for the statistician to restrict her attention to increasing
decision rules.
THEOREM 4: Suppose {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family and G is MLR-ordered.
Then the increasing decision rules form an essentially complete class.
Theorem 4 generalizes the complete class theorem of Karlin and Rubin
(1956), which in turn generalizes Blackwell and Girshik (1954, Theorem 7.4.3).
Karlin and Rubin (1956) established the essential completeness of increasing
decision rules under the assumption that {u(· s)}s∈S is a QCIP family, which
is a special case of our assumption that {u(· s)}s∈S forms an IDO family. Note
31Some readers may wonder why, in our deﬁnition of a decision rule, we did not allow the
statistician to mix actions at any given signal. The answer is that when the signal space is atomless
(as we have assumed), allowing her to do so will not make a difference, since the set of decision
rules involving only pure actions form an essentially complete class (see Blackwell (1951)).
32In the context of statistical decisions, the maxmin criterion was ﬁrst studied by Wald; the
minimax regret criterion is due to Savage. Discussion and motivation for the maxmin and min-
imax regret criteria can be found in Blackwell and Girshik (1954), Berger (1985), and Manski
(2005). For some recent applications of the minimax regret criterion, see Manski (2004, 2005)
and Manski and Tetenov (2007); a closely related criterion was employed by Chamberlain (2000).1980 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
that Theorem 4 is not known even for the case where {u(· s)}s∈S forms an SCP
family.
An immediate application of Theorem 4 is that it allows us to generalize
Theorem 3. Recall that Theorem 3 tells us that, for the Bayesian statistician,
if H is more accurate than G, then H achieves a higher ex ante utility. Com-
bining Theorem 4 and Proposition 9 allows us to strengthen that conclusion
by establishing the superiority of H over G under a more stringent criterion;
speciﬁcally, Corollary 1 below tells us that when an experiment H is more ac-
curate than G, then H is capable of achieving higher expected utility in all
states.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family, H is more accurate than
G, and G is MLR-ordered. Then for any decision rule ψ:Z → X under G, there
is an increasing decision rule φ:Z → X under H such that
EH(φ s) ≥EG(ψ s) at each s ∈ S  (31)
PROOF:I f ψ is not increasing, then by Theorem 4, there is an increasing rule
¯ ψ that is at least as good as ψ.P r o p o s i t i o n9 in turn guarantees that there is an
increasing decision rule φ under H that is at least as good as ¯ ψ,s i n c e( 23)s a y s
that EH(φ s) ≥EG( ¯ ψ s) at each s. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 is a generalization of Lehmann (1988), which established a ver-
sion of this result in the case where {u(· s)}s∈S is a QCIP family. This result is
not known even for the case where {u(· s)}s∈S forms an SCP family.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: Having assumed that Z is a compact interval, we
can assume, without further loss of generality, that Z =[ 0 1].L e tψ be a de-
cision rule (not necessarily increasing) under G. We show that there exists an
increasing decision rule that is at least as good as ψ. We shall conﬁne ourselves
here to the case where ψ takes only ﬁnitely many values, an assumption which
certainly holds if the set of actions X is ﬁnite. The case where ψ has an inﬁnite
range is covered in the Appendix.
The proof is divided into two steps. In Step 1, we show that given G and
ψ, there is another information structure ¯ G and a decision rule ¯ ψ that gives
exactly the same payoff distribution as ψ (under G) in every state. In Step 2,
weshowthattheinformationstructure ¯ G islessaccuratethan G.Itthenfollows
from Proposition 9 that there is an increasing decision rule under G that is at
least as good as ¯ ψ (under ¯ G) and hence at least as good as ψ (under G). In
other words, the decision-maker who uses a strategy that is not increasing is, in
a sense, debasing the information made available to her by G.
Step 1. Suppose that the actions taken under ψ are exactly x1, x2     x n
(arranged in increasing order). We construct a new information structure ¯ G =
{ ¯ G(·|s)}s∈S along the following lines. For each s, ¯ G(0|s) = 0a n d ¯ G(k/n|s) =STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1981
PrG[ψ(z) ≤ xk|s] for k = 1 2     n, where the right side of the second equa-
tion refers to the probability of {z ∈ Z:ψ(z) ≤ xk} under the distribution
G(·|s).W ed e ﬁ n etk(s) as the unique element in Z that obeys G(tk(s)|s) =
¯ G(k/n|s). (Note that t0(s) = 0f o ra l ls.) Any z in ((k − 1)/n k/n) may be
written as z = θ[(k−1)/n]+(1−θ)[k/n] for some θ in (0 1).W ed e ﬁ n e
¯ G(z|s)= G(θtk−1(s)+(1−θ)tk(s)|s)  (32)
This completely speciﬁes ¯ G.
Deﬁne a new decision rule ¯ ψ by ¯ ψ(z) = x1 for z in [0 1/n];f o rk ≥ 2, we
have ¯ ψ(z) = xk for z in ((k − 1)/n k/n]. This is an increasing decision rule
since we have arranged xk to be increasing with k. It is also clear from our
construction of ¯ G and ¯ ψ that, at each state s, the distribution of utility induced
by ¯ G and ¯ ψ equals the distribution of utility induced by G and ψ.
Step2.Weclaimthat G ismoreaccuratethan ¯ G.Providedthisistrue,Propo-
sition 9 says that there is an increasing decision rule φ under G that is at least
as good as ¯ ψ under ¯ G, that is, at each s, the distribution of utility induced by G
and φ ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that induced by ¯ G and ¯ ψ. Since the
latter coincides with the distribution of utility induced by G and ψ, the proof
is complete.
That G is more accurate than ¯ G follows from the assumption that G is MLR-
ordered. Denote the density function associated to the distribution G(·|s) by
g(·|s).Theprobabilityof Zk ={ z ∈ Z:ψ(z) ≤ xk} isgivenby

1Zk(z)g(z|s)dz,
where 1Zk is the indicator function of Zk. By the deﬁnition of ¯ G,w eh a v e
¯ G(k/n|s)=

1Zk(z)g(z|s)dz 
Recall that tk(s) is deﬁned as the unique element that obeys G(tk(s)|s) =
¯ G(k/n|s); equivalently,
¯ G(k/n|s)−G(tk(s)|s)=
 	
1Zk(z)−1[0 tk(s)](z)


g(z|s)dz = 0  (33)
The function W given by W( z)= 1Zk(z) − 1[0 tk(s)](z) has the following single-
crossing-type condition: for z>t k(s),w eh a v eW( z)≥ 0, and for z ≤ tk(s),w e
have W( z)≤ 0.33 Let s  >s;s i n c eG(·|s) is MLR-ordered, g(z|s )/g(z|s) is an
increasing function of z. By a standard result (see, for example, Athey (2002,
Lemma 5)), we have
¯ G(k/n|s
 )−G(tk(s)|s
 ) =
 	
1Zk(z)−1[0 tk(s)](z)


g(z|s
 )dz≥ 0  (34)
33This property is related to but not the same as the single crossing property we have deﬁned
in this paper; Athey (2002) referred to this property as SC1 and the one we use as SC2.1982 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
This implies that tk(s ) ≥ tk(s) since G(tk(s )|s ) = ¯ G(k/n|s ).
To show that G is more accurate than ¯ G,w er e q u i r eT(z s) to be in-
creasing in s,w h e r eT is deﬁned by G(T(z s)|s) = ¯ G(z|s).F o rz = k/n,
T(z s)= tk(s), which we have shown is increasing in s.F o rz in the in-
terval ((k − 1)/n k/n), recall (see (32)) that ¯ G(z) was deﬁned such that
T(z s)= θtk−1(s) + (1 − θ)tk(s).S i n c eb o t htk−1 and tk are increasing in s,
T(z s)is also increasing in s. Q.E.D.
It is clear from our proof of Theorem 4 that we can in fact give a sharper
statement of that result; we do so below.
THEOREM 4 : Suppose {u(· s)}s∈S is an IDO family and G is MLR-ordered.
Then for any decision rule ψ:Z → X, there is an increasing decision rule φ:Z →
X such that, at each s, the distribution of utility induced by G and φ ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of utility induced by G and ψ.
Complete class theorems obviously have a role in statistics and economet-
rics, but they are also relevant in theoretical economic modeling. The next
example gives an instance of such an application.
EXAMPLE 6—Continued: Recall that we assume in Section 5 that the man-
ager’s decision rule under G is increasing in the signal. This restriction on the
decision rule needs to be justiﬁed; provided G is MLR-ordered, this justiﬁca-
tion is provided byTheorem 4 .Le t ˜ ψ bea (not necessarily increasing) decision
rule. Theorem 4  tells us that for some investor k, there is an increasing deci-
sion rule ψ:Z → X such that, at each s, the distribution of uk induced by G
and ψ ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of uk induced by G
and ˜ ψ. This implies that

z∈Z
uk(φ(z) s)dG(z|s)≥

z∈Z
uk( ˜ ψ(z) s)dG(z|s)  (35)
Aggregating this inequality across states, we obtain Uk(ψ G Λ k) ≥ Uk( ˜ ψ G 
Λk), that is, the increasing rule gives investor k a higher ex ante utility.
However, we can say more because, for any other investor i, ui(· s)is just
an increasing transformation of uk(· s), that is, there is a strictly increasing
function f such that ui = f ◦ uk. Appealing to Theorem 4  again, we see that
(35)i st r u ei fuk is replaced with ui. Aggregating this inequality across states
gives us Ui(ψ G Λ i) ≥ Ui( ˜ ψ G Λi). In short, we have shown that any deci-
sion rule admits an increasing decision rule that (weakly) raises the ex ante
utility of every investor. This justiﬁes our assumption that the manager uses an
increasing decision rule.
Our ﬁnal application generalizes an example found in Manski (2005,P r o p o -
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EXAMPLE 7: Suppose that there are two ways to treat patients with a partic-
ular medical condition. Treatment A is the status quo; it is known that a patient
who receives this treatment will recover with probability ¯ pA. Treatment B is a
new treatment whose effectiveness is unknown. The probability of recovery
with this treatment, pB, corresponds to the unknown state of the world and
takes values in some set P. We assume that the planner receives a signal z of
pB that is MLR-ordered with respect to pB.( M a n s k i( 2005) considered the
case of N subjects who were randomly selected to receive treatment B, with z
being the number who were cured. Clearly, the distribution of z is binomial; it
is also not hard to check that it is MLR-ordered with respect to pB.)
Normalizing the utility of a cure at 1 and that of no cure at 0, the planner’s
expected utility when a member of the population receives treatment A is ¯ pA.
Similarly, the expected utility of treatment B is pB. Therefore, the planner’s
utility if she subjects fraction x of the population to B (and the rest to A) is
u(x p
B) = (1−x) ¯ p
A +xp
B  (36)
The planner’s decision (treatment) rule maps z to the proportion x of the
(patient) population who will receive treatment B. As pointed out in Manski
(2005), {u(x ·)}pB∈P is a QCIP family, and so Karlin and Rubin (1956)g u a r a n -
teed that decision rules where x increases with z form an essentially complete
class.
Suppose now that the planner has a different payoff function that takes into
account the cost of the treatment. We denote the cost of having fraction x
treated with B and the rest with A by C(x). Then the payoff function is
u(x p
B) = (1−x) ¯ p
A +xp
B −C(x) 
If the cost of treatments A and B are both linear or, more generally, if C is
convex, then one can check that {u(x ·)}pB∈P will still be a QCIP family. We
can then appeal to Karlin and Rubin (1956) to obtain the essential complete-
ness of the increasing decision rules. But there is no particular reason to be-
lieve that C is convex; indeed C will never be convex if the presence of scale
economies leads to the total cost of having both treatments in use being more
expensive than subjecting the entire population to one treatment or the other.
(Formally, there is x∗ ∈ (0 1) such that C(0)<C( x ∗)>C( 1).) However, u is
supermodular in (x pB) whatever the shape of C,s o{u(x ·)}pB∈P is an IDO
family; Theorem 4 tells us that the planner may conﬁne herself to increasing
decision rules since they form an essentially complete class.34
34Manski and Tetenov (2007) proved a complete class theorem with a different variation on the
payoff function (36). For the payoff function (36), Manski (2005) in fact showed a sharper result:
the planner will choose a rule where the whole population is subject to B (A) if the number of
treatment successes in the sample goes above (below) a particular threshold. The modiﬁcation
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7. CONCLUSION
In their conclusion, Milgrom and Shannon (1994), noted that
   the theory of monotone comparative statics, even for optimization models, is still un-
ﬁnished. One priority is the analysis of economic applications involving stochastic models.
The ﬁrst- and second-order stochastic dominance relations, Blackwell’s informativeness
order for information systems, and the likelihood ratio order are among ones that could
be usefully integrated with the single crossing and/or supermodularity conditions.
Part of this paper addresses the issues highlighted by Milgrom and Shannon;
we have shown that the interval dominance order provides a uniﬁed frame-
work which connects and generalizes Lehman’s informativeness theorem, and
Karlin and Rubin’s monotone class theorem, as well as the comparative statics
theorems under uncertainty of Ormiston and Schlee (1993) and Athey (2002).
In addition, the interval dominance order provides its own set of applications,
such as to optimal stopping problems,which arenot covered byearlier assump-
tions.
There are many ways in which the ideas in this paper can be further de-
veloped. For example, IDO can be extended to a multidimensional setting.
Notions like quasisupermodularity (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)) and C-
quasisupermodularity (Quah (2007)), which are important for multidimen-
sional comparative statics, are essentially variations on the single crossing
property; therefore, like the single crossing property, they can be general-
ized. We explore these issues in a companion paper (see Quah and Strulovici
(2007)). An issue closely connected with the value of information is the mar-
ginal incentive to acquire information and the extent to which it varies with
the payoff functions and (in games) the nature of the strategic interaction. We
hope that the ideas developed here can be employed to help address those
issues.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: We ﬁrst establish the following lemma.
LEMMA 4: Let {di}0≤i≤M and {ai}0≤i≤M be two ﬁnite sequences of real num-
bers with the properties Dj =
M
i=j di ≥ 0 for j = 0 1     M and ai+1 ≥ ai. Then
M
i=0aidi ≥ a0D0.
PROOF: It is straightforward to check that
a0D0 +
M 
i=0
Di(ai −ai−1) =
M 
i=0
aibi (37)
fractional treatment rules, in which, for a nonnegligible set of sample outcomes, both treatments
will be in use. In our variation on (36), it is clear that fractional treatment is plausible if large
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(this is just a discrete version of integration by parts). This gives us the desired
conclusion, since the assumptions guarantee that
M
i=0Di(ai −ai−1) ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
Returning to the proof of Proposition 3, suppose f(x k+K) ≥ f(x k+i) for i =
0 1 2     K−1. This means that Dj =
K−1
i=j di ≥ 0 (for j = 0 1     (K−1)),
where di = f(x k+i+1) − f(x k+i).D e n o t i n gai = α(xi),( 11) and Lemma 4 give
us
K−1 
i=0
[g(xk+i+1)−g(xk+i)]≥
K−1 
i=0
aidi ≥ a0(f(xk+K)−f(x k)) 
Since
K−1
i=0 [g(xk+i+1) − g(xk+i)]=g(xk+K) − g(xk),w eo b t a i ng(xk+K) ≥
(>) g(xk) if f(x k+K) ≥ (>) f(x k). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: It sufﬁces to show that condition (B) in Propo-
sition 1 holds. To do that, we require the following lemma.
LEMMA 5: Suppose f and g obey the conditions of Proposition 4. In addition,
suppose f is strictly decreasing in the interval [x1 x 2] and strictly increasing in the
interval [x3 x 4], with x2 ≤ x3, f(x 1) = f(x 4), and f(x 2) = f(x 3). Then
[g(x4)−g(x3)]+[g(x2)−g(x1)]≥0  (38)
PROOF:D e ﬁ n e z:[x1 x 2]→[ x3 x 4] by f(x)= f(z(x)).E x c e p tw h e nf   = 0
(and there are just ﬁnitely many such points in [x3 x 4] since f is analytic), z
is differentiable and f  (x) = f  (z(x))z (x). Therefore, for all but ﬁnitely many
values of x in [x1 x 2],
g
 (x)−g
 (z(x))z
 (x) =
g (x)
f  (x)
f
 (x)−
g (z(x))
f  (z(x))
f
 (z(x))z
 (x)
≥
g (x)
f  (x)
	
f
 (x)−f
 (z(x))z
 (x)


= 0 
Integrating this inequality between x1 and x2 gives us (38). Q.E.D.
Returning to the proof of Proposition 4, suppose f(x  ) = f(x   ) and f(x)≤
f(x  ) for x ∈[ x  x   ]. We prove that g(x  ) ≥ g(x ) by induction on the number
of local maxima in the open interval (x  x   ).( S i n c ef is analytic, this num-1986 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
ber is ﬁnite; note also that there cannot be intervals within [x  x   ] where f
is constant, because that implies that f is constant in X.) First consider the
case where, in (x  x   ), f has no local maxima but achieves its minimum at
x∗. Applying Lemma 5 (with x4 = x  , x1 = x ,a n dx2 = x3 = x∗), we obtain
g(x  )−g(x ) ≥ 0.
Now consider the case where there are K local maxima in the interval
(x  x   ).L e tx∗ be the highest of these local peaks; formally f(x ∗) ≥ f(x  )
for any x  which is a local maximum of f.W ed e ﬁ n ex to be the smallest x
in [x  x   ] such that f(x ∗) = f(x) and deﬁne ¯ x to be the largest x such that
f(x ∗) = f(¯ x). By continuity, these points exist, and f is strictly increasing in
[¯ x x  ] and strictly decreasing in [x  x]. In the interval (x x ∗), f has strictly
fewer than K local maxima, so (i) g(x) ≤ g(x∗). Similarly, (ii) g(x∗) ≤ g(¯ x)
since f has strictly fewer than K local maxima in (x∗  ¯ x). Finally, Lemma 5
guarantees that (iii) [g(x  )−g(¯ x)]+[g(x)−g(x )]≥0. Together, the inequal-
ities (i)–(iii) guarantee that g(x  )−g(x ) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2—The Case Where S Is Finite: We can assume, with
no loss of generality, that S ={ 1 2     N}. The agent’s objective function is
F(x λ)=
N
i=1f(x i)λ i,w h e r eλi is the probability of state i;w ew i s ht os h o w
that F(· γ) I F(· λ)if γ is an MLR shift of λ.
ThisclaimfollowsfromanapplicationofTheorem2inthecasewhere S isan
interval (which was proved in the main body of the paper). Deﬁne ¯ S = (0 N]
and the family { ¯ f(· s)}s∈¯ S by ¯ f(x s)= ¯ f(x i) whenever s ∈ (i − 1 i],w h e r e
i = 1 2     N. The density function ¯ λ:S → R (and similarly ¯ γ)i sd e ﬁ n e d
by ¯ λ(s) = λi for s ∈ (i − 1 i]. Clearly, ¯ γ is an MLR shift of ¯ λ, { ¯ f(· s)}s∈S is
an IDO family, ¯ F(x  ¯ γ) = F(x γ),a n d ¯ F(x ¯ λ) = F(x λ) (where ¯ F(x ¯ λ) = 
S
¯ f(x s)¯ λ(s)ds). Theorem 2 (for an interval S) tells us that ¯ F(·  ¯ γ) I ¯ F(·  ¯ λ);
in other words, F(· γ) I F(· λ). Q.E.D.
PROOF OFPROPOSITION8: Supposethat γ isnotanMLRshiftofλ,sothere
are states k and k+1 such that γk/λk >γ k+1/λk+1,w h e r eλk is the probability
of state k, and so forth. It follows that there is positive scalar a such that
λk+1a
λk
> 1 >
γk+1a
γk
  (39)
LetX ={ x1 x 2} with x1 <x 2 and deﬁne {f(· i)}i∈S in the following way: for i<
k, f(x 1 i)= ε and f(x 2 i)= 0;for i = k, f(x 1 k)= 1a n df(x 2 k)= 0;for i =
k + 1, f(x 1 k+ 1) = 0a n df(x 2 k+ 1) = a; ﬁnally, for i>k+ 1, f(x 1 i)= 0
and f(x 2 i)= ε. This is an SCP family provided ε>0, since f(x 2 i)−f(x 1 i)
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Note that the ﬁrst inequality in (39) says that λk+1a>λ k,s oi fε is small,
F(x2 λ)= λk+1a+
N 
i=k+2
λiε>
k−1 
i=1
λiε+λk = F(x1 λ) 
Now the second inequality in (39) says that γk >γ k+1a,s oi fε is sufﬁciently
small,
F(x1 γ)=
k−1 
i=1
γiε+γk >γ k+1a+
N 
i=k+2
γiε = F(x2 γ) 
So the shift from λ to γ has reduced the optimal value of x from x2 to x1.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3—Continued: We ﬁrst show that φ (as constructed in
the proof in Section 5) is an increasing rule. We wish to compare φ(t ) against
φ(t) where t  >t. Note that the construction of φ(t) involves partitioning S
into subsets S1, S2     S M that obey (i)–(v). In particular, (v) says that for any
s in Sm, ψ(τ(t s)) takes the same value, which we denote by ψm.T oo b t a i n
φ(t ), we ﬁrst partition S into disjoints sets S 
1, S 
2     S 
L,w h e r eL is odd, with
the partition satisfying properties (i)–(v). The important thing to note is that,
for any s,w eh a v e
ψ(τ(t
  s))≥ ψ(τ(t s))  (40)
This is clear: both ψ and τ(· s)are increasing functions and t  >t.W ed e n o t e
ψ(τ(t  s))for s in S 
k by ψ 
k.A n ys in S belongs to some Sm and some S 
k,i n
which case (40) may be rewritten as
ψ
 
k ≥ ψm  (41)
The construction of φ(t ) involves the construction of ˆ φ 
2, ˆ φ 
4, and so forth.
The action ˆ φ 
2 is the largest action that maximizes u(· s∗) in the interval
[ψ 
2 ψ  
1]. Comparing this with ˆ φ2, which is the largest action that maximizes
u(· s∗) in the interval [ψ2 ψ 1], we know that ˆ φ 
2 ≥ ˆ φ2, since (following from
(41)) ψ 
2 ≥ ψ2 and ψ 
1 ≥ ψ1.
By deﬁnition, ˆ φ 
4 is the largest action that maximizes u(· s 
3) in [ψ 
4  ˆ φ 
2],
where s 
3 refers to the unique element in S 
3.L e t ¯ m be the largest odd number
such that s ¯ m ≤ s 
3. (Recall that s ¯ m is the unique element in S ¯ m.) By deﬁnition,
ˆ φ ¯ m+1 is the largest element that maximizes u(· s¯ m) in [ψ ¯ m+1  ˆ φ ¯ m−1].W ec l a i m
that ˆ φ 
4 ≥ ˆ φ ¯ m+1.T h i si sa na p p l i c a t i o no fT h e o r e m1. It follows from (i) s 
3 ≥ s ¯ m,
so u(· s 
3)  I u(· s¯ m), (ii) the manner in which ¯ m is deﬁned, along with (41),1988 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
guarantees that ψ 
4 ≥ ψ ¯ m+1, and (iii) we know (from the previous paragraph)
that ˆ φ 
2 ≥ ˆ φ2 ≥ ˆ φ ¯ m−1.
So we obtain ˆ φ 
4 ≥ ˆ φ ¯ m+1 ≥ φ(t). Repeating the argument ﬁnitely many
times (on ˆ φ 
6 and so on), we obtain φ(t ) ≥ φ(t). This completes the proof
of Lemma 3 in the special case where ψ takes ﬁnitely many values.
Extension to the Case Where the Range of ψ Is Inﬁnite. The strategy is to
approximate ψ with a sequence of simpler decision rules. Let {An}n≥1 be a
sequence of ﬁnite subsets of X such that An ⊂ An+1 and

n≥1An is dense
in X. (This sequence exists because X is compact.) The function ψn:Z → X
is deﬁned as follows: ψn(z) is the largest element in An that is less than or
equal to ψ(z). The sequence of decision rules ψn has the properties (i) ψn is
increasing in z, (ii) ψn+1(z) ≥ ψn(z) for all z, (iii) the range of ψn is ﬁnite, and
(iv) the increasing sequence ψn converges to ψ pointwise.
Since ψn takes only ﬁnitely many values, we know there is an increasing de-
cision rule φn (as deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 3 in Section 5) such that
u

φn(T(z s)) s

≥ u(ψn(z) s) for all (z s)  (42)
We claim that φn is also an increasing sequence. This follows from the fact that
ψn+1(τ(t s)) ≥ ψn(τ(t s)) for all (t s)  (43)
This inequality plays the same role as (40); the latter was used to show that
φ(t ) ≥ φ(t). Mimicking the argument there, (43) tells us that φn+1(t) ≥ φn(t).
Since φn is an increasing sequence and X is compact, it has a limit, which we
denote as φ. Since, for each n, φn is an increasing decision rule, φ is also an
increasing decision rule. For each n,( 42) holds; taking limits and using the con-
tinuity of u with respect to x,w eo b t a i nu(φ(T(z s)) s) ≥ u(ψ(z) s). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11—Continued: It remains for us to show how ¯ Λ
is constructed. We denote the density function of H(·|s) by h(·|s).I ti sc l e a r
that since the actions are nonordered, we may choose ¯ λ(s1) and ¯ λ(s2) (the
probabilities of s1 and s2, respectively) such that
¯ λ(s1)h(¯ t|s1)[u(x1 s 1)−u(x2 s 1)] (44)
= ¯ λ(s2)h(¯ t|s2)[u(x2|s2)−u(x1 s 2)] 
Rearranging this equation, we obtain
¯ λ(s1)h(¯ t|s1)u(x1|s1)+ ¯ λ(s2)h(¯ t|s2)u(x1|s2) (45)
= ¯ λ(s1)h(¯ t|s1)u(x2|s1)+ ¯ λ(s2)h(¯ t|s2)u(x2|s2) 
Therefore, given the prior ¯ Λ, the posterior distribution after observing ¯ t is such
that the agent is indifferent between actions x1 and x2.STATICS, INFORMATIVENESS, AND THE INTERVAL DOMINANCE 1989
Suppose the agent receives the signal z<¯ t.S i n c eH is MLR-ordered, we
have
h(z|s1)
h(¯ t|s1)
≥
h(z|s2)
h(¯ t|s2)
 
This fact, together with (44), guarantees that
¯ λ(s1)h(z|s1)[u(x1 s 1)−u(x2 s 1)]
≥ ¯ λ(s2)h(z|s2)[u(x2|s2)−u(x1 s 2)] 
Rearranging this equation, we obtain
¯ λ(s1)h(z|s1)u(x1|s1)+ ¯ λ(s2)h(z|s2)u(x1|s2)
≥ ¯ λ(s1)h(z|s1)u(x2|s1)+ ¯ λ(s2)h(z|s2)u(x2|s2) 
So, after observing z<¯ t, the (posterior) expected utility of action x1 is greater
than that of x2. In a similar way, we can show that x2 is the optimal action after
observing a signal z ≥ ¯ t. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4—The Case Where ψ Has an Inﬁnite Range: We
construct an alternative experiment ¯ G and increasing decision rule ¯ ψ with the
following two properties:
(P1) At each state s, the distribution of losses induced by ¯ G and ¯ ψ equals
that induced by G and ψ.
(P2) G is more accurate than ¯ G.
An application of Proposition 9 then guarantees that there is an increasing
decision rule under G that is at least as good as ψ. Thus our proof is essen-
tially the same as the one we gave for the ﬁnite case in Section 6, except that
construction of ¯ G and ¯ ψ is more complicated.
Since X is compact, there is a smallest compact interval M that contains X.
At a state s, we denote the distribution on M induced by G and ψ by F(·|s),
that is, for any x in M, F(x|s) = PrG[ψ(z) ≤ x|s]. There are two noteworthy
features of {F(·|s)}s∈S:
(i) For a ﬁxed ¯ s, we may partition M into (disjoint) contour sets U¯ s(r), that
is, U¯ s(r) ={ x ∈ M :F(x|¯ s) = r}. It is possible that for some r, U¯ s(r) is empty,
but if it is nonempty, then it has a minimum and the minimum is in X (and not
just in M). Crucially, this partition is common across all states s, that is, for any
other state s, there is some r  such that Us(r ) = U¯ s(r).
(ii) The atoms of F(·|s) also do not vary with s; that is, if x is an atom for
F(·|¯ s), then it is an atom for F(·|s) for every other state s.
Features (i) and (ii) follow easily from the deﬁnition of F, the compactness
of X, and the fact that G(·|s) is atomless and has support Z at every state s.1990 J. K.-H. QUAH AND B. STRULOVICI
To each element x in M we associate a number ε(x),w h e r eε(x) > 0i fa n d
only if x is an atom and

x∈X ε(x) < ∞. (Note that there are at most count-
ably many atoms, so the inﬁnite summation makes sense.) We deﬁne the map
Y :M → R,w h e r eY(x)= x +

{x ∈M:x ≤x}ε(x ). It is clear that this map is a
strictly increasing and hence 1–1 map. Let Y ∗ =

x∈M[Y(x)− ε(x) Y(x)].
The difference between Y ∗ and the range of Y (i.e., set Y ∗ \ Y(M)), may be
written in the form
∞
n=1In,w h e r eIn =[ Y(a n) − ε(an) Y(an)) and {an}n∈N is
the set of atoms. (Loosely speaking, the “gaps” In arise at every atom.)
We deﬁne the distribution ˜ G(·|s)on Y ∗ in the following way. For y in Y(M),
˜ G(y|s) = F(Y−1(y)|s).F o ry = Y(a n) − ε(an), ˜ G(y|s) is the limit of ˜ G(yn|s),
where yn is a sequence in Y(M) tending to y from the left; if no such se-
quence exists (which occurs if and only if there is an atom at the smallest
element of X), let ˜ G(y|s) = 0. (One can check that this deﬁnition is un-
ambiguous.) It remains for us to deﬁne ˜ G(y|s) for y in the open interval
(Y(an) − ε(an) Y(an)).F o ry = C(an) or y = C(an) − ε(an),d e ﬁ n et(y) by
G(t(y)|s)= ˜ G(y|s). Any element y in (Y(an) − ε(an) Y(an)) may be written
as θ[Y(a n)−ε(an)]+(1−θ)[Y(a n)].W ed e ﬁ n e
˜ G(y|s)= G

θt(C(an)−ε(an))+(1−θ)t(C(an))|s

 
We have now completely speciﬁed the distribution ˜ G(·|s). Note that we have
constructed this distribution to be atomless, so for every number r in [0 1],
the set {y ∈ Y ∗: ˜ G(y|s) = r} is nonempty. Indeed, following from observation
(i) above, this set has a smallest element, which we denote by ˆ y(r).W ed e ﬁ n e
Y ∗∗ ={ˆ y(r):r ∈[ 0 1]}. Observation (i) also tells us that Y ∗∗ does not vary with
s. We denote the restriction of ˜ G(·|s) to Y ∗∗ by ¯ G(·|s). Therefore, for any r in
[0 1] and any state s, there is a unique y in Y ∗∗ such that ¯ G(y|s)= r.
One can check that property (P2) (stated above) holds: G is more accurate
than ¯ G. Formally, the map T deﬁned by G(T(y s)|s)= ¯ G(y|s) exists and has
the property that T(y s)is increasing in s; the proof is substantially the same
as that for the ﬁnite case. Furthermore, T(·|s) has a unique inverse (in Y ∗∗).
So we have identiﬁed precisely the properties of T needed for the application
of Proposition 9. Consider the decision rule ¯ ψ:Y ∗∗ → X deﬁned as follows: if
y is in Y(M),d e ﬁ n e ¯ ψ(y) = Y −1(y);i fy is in [Y(a n) − ε(an) Y(an)),d e ﬁ n e
¯ ψ(y) = an. It is not hard to verify that ¯ G and ¯ ψ generate the same distribution
of losses as G and ψ, as required by (P1). Q.E.D.
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